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ABSTRACT 
The Obama Administration’s “Clean Power Plan” for addressing 
industrial carbon emissions is controversial as a matter of environmental 
policy. It also has important constitutional implications. The rule was 
initially crafted not by officers or employees of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, but by two private lawyers and a scientist with 
industry ties. Private parties operate extra-constitutionally, and no 
existing legal doctrine tethers constitutional scrutiny to the nature of the 
power delegated to them. The nondelegation doctrine applies to 
delegations by Congress—not to agencies’ subdelegations of legislative 
power to private parties. The other doctrinal lens for reviewing 
rulemaking by entities other than Congress—Chevron U.S.A. v. National 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. and its progeny—is equally blind to 
subdelegations of policymaking authority to parties that function beyond 
the boundaries of the Constitution. This Article takes up the issue of 
private rulemaking, and argues that its inescapable constitutional 
implications warrant a stronger nondelegation doctrine and a more 
nuanced approach to Chevron that emphasizes public accountability, 
legitimacy, transparency, and rational decision-making over notions of 
agency prerogative.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In what The New York Times called “Mr. Obama’s boldest step in 
using his executive authority to halt the warming of the planet,” the 
President in June of 2014 proposed a regulation designed to substantially 
cut carbon emissions from power plants over the next 15 years.
1
 He 
unveiled the final rule on August 3, 2015.
2
 With major implications for the 
global fight to stall climate change, the rule was swiftly assailed as 
“unrealistic.”3 Twenty-four states and a private coal company have 
challenged the EPA’s rule in federal court.4 The EPA’s “Clean Power 
 
 
 1. Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page From Health Care Act, Obama Climate Plan 
Relies on States, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/politics/obama-
epa-rule-coal-carbon-pollution-power-plants.html (describing criticisms of proposed rule); David 
Jackson, Obama to Reveal Plan for Cutting Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2015, 
5:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/02/obama-administration-reveal-emissions-
regulations-plan/31012963/. 
 2. Colleen McCain Nelson & Amy Harder, Obama Announces Rule to Cut Carbon Emissions 
from Power Plants, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015, 7:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-
announces-rule-to-cut-carbon-emissions-from-power-plants-1438627158. 
 3. William O’Keefe, The EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Impractical and Unrealistic, THE HILL 
(Aug. 6, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/250393-the-
epas-clean-power-plan-impractical-and-unrealistic.  
 4. Cole Mellino, 24 States Sue Obama Over Clean Power Plan, ECOWATCH (Oct. 24, 2015, 
10:18 AM), http://ecowatch.com/2015/10/24/clean-power-plan-lawsuits/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/5
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Plan” (“CPP”) also raises a separation of powers problem. When private 
parties—here, two lawyers, a scientist, and a prominent environmental 
action group—craft regulatory policy,5 is the final rule governed by the 
same constitutional norms that apply to lawmaking conducted exclusively 
by government actors?  
To be sure, section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) gives the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) the legal authority to issue the 
CPP.
6
 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,
7
 the Court famously addressed the separation of powers implications 
of Congress’s delegation of rulemaking authority in the CAA, holding that 
the EPA’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language—not that of the 
courts—receives deference. Chevron thus made clear that, despite the 
mandate of Article I, Congress has the constitutional authority to hand off 
its legislative baton to federal agencies with impunity.  
In bearing the heavy imprint of private influence, however, the CPP 
does not lie squarely within the realm of government action. If public, 
private, and quasi-public actions were plotted on a constitutional 
continuum—with acts of the President at one end and those of purely 
private parties at the other—the CPP would fit somewhere between those 
poles.
8
 The question then becomes whether the constitutional rationales for 
Chevron deference apply with equal force when the private sector engages 
in legislative rulemaking on the President’s behalf, as with the CPP. This 
question inevitably invokes consideration of a related doctrine that 
preceded Chevron: nondelegation.  
The nondelegation doctrine is a Lockean notion that is fundamental to 
the separation of powers.
9
 In theory, nondelegation ensures that 
policymaking resides in the branch of government that is most responsive 
to popular will. It evolved in response to two kinds of delegations of 
legislative power: delegations to federal agencies and delegations to the 
private sector. Since the doctrine’s post-New Deal heyday, the Court has 
consistently deemed delegations of legislative authority to federal agencies 
 
 
 5. See Coral Davenport, Taking Oil Industry Cue, Environmentalists Drew Emissions Blueprint, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/us/how-environmentalists-drew-
blueprint-for-obama-emissions-rule.html?_r=0. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2014); What EPA is Doing, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-
pollution-standards/what-epa-doing#overview (last updated Feb. 29, 2016). 
 7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 8. See generally Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural Constitution, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 507–12 (2011) (arguing that public-private relationships fall on a 
constitutional continuum). 
 9. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 254–55 (2010).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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constitutional so long as Congress includes an “intelligible principle” in 
the enabling statute to guide the exercise of agency discretion.
10
 With 
Chevron, the Court effectively reversed course, enhancing agencies’ 
discretion to make laws pursuant to vague legislative mandates—at the 
expense of de novo judicial review.  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of Congress’s 
authority to delegate its legislative power to the executive branch (and, for 
that matter, the private sector), constitutional doctrine says nothing about 
agencies’ authority to subdelegate the same legislative powers to private 
parties. Because the Constitution does not restrict private behavior, 
rulemaking sheds its constitutional character when non-federal actors 
conduct it.
11
 Thus, whereas congressional attempts to delegate legislative 
power trigger constitutional scrutiny, agency attempts to delegate 
rulemaking authority do not. Such a paradox—that important 
constitutional values come into play only when Congress attempts to 
privatize government, and not when agencies do—flies in the face of over 
a century of separation of powers doctrine.
12
 It makes little sense for the 
Supreme Court to wrestle with line drawing around shared governmental 
powers if the question can be so easily nullified by a contract handing off 
rulemaking powers to an extra-constitutional, private actor.  
This Article considers executive branch outsourcing of legislative 
power to private parties, and argues that its inescapable constitutional 
implications warrant a stronger nondelegation doctrine and a more 
nuanced approach to Chevron that emphasizes public accountability, 
legitimacy, transparency, and rational decisionmaking over notions of 
agency prerogative. The Chevron doctrine—like nondelegation—is driven 
by normative judgments as to which branch of government is best suited 
to make policy; by any measure, biased private actors do not qualify. 
Part I describes the private exercise of public power in practical terms. 
It then situates the issue on a constitutional policymaking continuum. This 
approach is offered as a substitute paradigm for the strict public/private 
divide that currently drives constitutional doctrine. Whereas a handful of 
baseline values for good government necessarily influence the exercise of 
public power at the governmental end of the continuum, they do not color 
the exercise of identical powers by actors at the private end of that 
spectrum under current law.  
 
 
 10. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989). 
 11. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 587, 592–93 (1991). 
 12.  See infra Part II.A (discussing the nondelegation doctrines). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PUBLIC LAWS AND PRIVATE LAWMAKERS 619 
 
 
 
 
Part II explores the constitutional doctrine bearing on the anomaly 
illustrated by the constitutional policymaking continuum: although the 
constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of legislative powers outside 
Article I is addressed by the nondelegation and private delegation 
doctrines, the constitutionality of agencies’ delegation of the same power 
beyond the confines of Article II are not covered by these or any other 
constitutional theories. The other available lens for judicial review of such 
delegations—Chevron and its progeny—similarly fails to recognize that 
executive branch subdelegations of legislative power to private parties 
frustrate the Court’s justifications for deference to agency policymaking. 
Part III argues that agency subdelegations of legislative power to the 
private sector should be subjected to heightened separation of powers 
scrutiny, not exempt from it. Currently, there is no statutory or doctrinal 
framework governing how agencies craft policy in the initial drafts of 
legislative rules. Nor does any law limit the private sector’s influence on 
that process. This Part posits that courts should recognize a private 
subdelegation doctrine and expanded approach to Chevron step zero in 
order to account for private sector rulemaking that is not authorized by 
Congress in enabling legislation. Such a functional approach to agency 
subdelegations of legislative power is consistent with the Court’s 
pragmatic stance on delegation. It would also foster normative values of 
good government that underlie the structural Constitution, including public 
accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and rational decisionmaking. 
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The terms “privatization” and “outsourcing”13 cover a broad spectrum 
of public-private relationships that exist across the federal government 
infrastructure. Today, private contractors outnumber federal employees by 
two to one,
14
 performing functions ranging from “the ‘merely’ advisory to 
the full-fledged assumption of policy-making authority.”15 Perhaps the 
most common form of outsourcing is the traditional service contract, 
whereby a private third party agrees to perform some function that the 
government would otherwise perform for itself, such as routine building 
 
 
 13. See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 2 n.4 (2007) (explaining that 
“[p]rivatization and outsourcing [can] be used interchangeably” and that “outsourcing is defined in 
terms of contracting-out government services within the United States”).  
 14. Charles Kenny, Why Private Contractors Are Lousy at Public Services, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2013, 4:51 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-28/ 
outsourcing-can-be-a-lousy-alternative-to-government-run-services.  
 15. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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maintenance. Outsourcing can take many other forms, including industry 
deregulation, voucher use, government corporations, the sale of 
government assets to the private sector,
16
 and the infusion of market 
principles into public sector employment.
17
  
Even less known and difficult to quantify is the extent to which the 
government relies on private parties to perform public functions 
informally—without any exchange of money or contractual agreements. 
As Edward Snowden’s leaks of classified information revealed, national 
security and federal law enforcement agencies glean untold terabytes of 
data from private corporations for the government’s own surveillance 
purposes.
18
 The government has also allowed factions of the private sector 
to craft national energy and environmental policy.
19
 When this happens, 
the Constitution does not apply to constrain the private exercise of public 
governance—even though identical actions by government actors would 
be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
20
 
This Part illustrates the arbitrary nature of the foregoing paradox by 
situating private parties along a constitutional policymaking continuum 
instead of within a wholly separate, extra-constitutional space. In 
exercising federal functions, private parties become anatomically related 
to government actors within a constitutional structure that leads all the 
way to the President. Yet the normative values underlying the structural 
Constitution—including accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and 
 
 
 16. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1507, 1519, 1525 (2001); Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and 
Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 113–17 (2005); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing 
Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266. 
 17. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1026 (2013); see also 
generally JANINE R. WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE: HOW THE WORLD’S NEW POWER BROKERS UNDERMINE 
DEMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE FREE MARKET 74–75 (2009) (discussing ways in which “a host 
of nongovernmental players do the government’s work, often overshadowing government 
bureaucracy, which sometimes looks like Swiss cheese: full of holes”). 
 18. See Craig Timberg & Barton Gellman, NSA Paying U.S. Companies for Access to 
Communications Networks, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/nsa-paying-us-companies-for-access-to-communications-networks/2013/08/29/5641a 
4b6-10c2-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html. 
 19. See Michael Abramowitz & Steve Mufson, Papers Detail Industry’s Role in Cheney’s 
Energy Report, WASH. POST (July 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/07/17/AR2007071701987.html. 
 20.  See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369–70 
(2003) (“A foundational premise of our constitutional order is that public and private are distinct 
spheres, with public agencies and employees being subject to constitutional constraints while private 
entities and individuals are not.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/5
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rational decisionmaking—do not readily apply to the full spectrum of 
public-private relationships implicating the exercise of federal powers.
21
  
A. The Issue: Agency Subdelegations of Legislative Power 
Lawmaking is arguably “the most important power created for our 
government by the Founders” because it is “linked to the will of the people 
through the electoral process and other means.”22 Of course, Congress 
routinely empowers agencies to implement statutes by promulgating rules 
with the force of law. Agencies’ rulemaking authority ultimately derives 
from Congress’s legislative power under Article I of the Constitution.23 In 
Yakus v. United States,
24
 the Supreme Court defined “[t]he essentials of 
the legislative function” as “the determination of . . . policy and its 
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct . . . 
which conform to standards and will tend to further the policy which 
Congress has established.”25 Because of its Article I origins, “a good case 
can be made that rule making is the most important function that agencies 
of government perform”—one that is potentially more significant than 
congressional legislation in terms of volume, specificity, and immediacy.
26
 
With today’s gridlocked Congress, the significance of rulemaking has 
intensified, as lobbyists turn to more sophisticated methods for influencing 
regulatory agencies.
27
 When the federal government outsources its 
delegated rulemaking powers to the private sector, there is even greater 
cause for constitutional concern because the rulemaking function loses its 
constitutional bearings. 
 
 
 21. See Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing 
Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1369, 1376 (2013); cf. VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 81 (noting that 
“[d]elegations of government authority to private hands . . . are decisions that potentially transfer 
sovereignty” and “should come with strings attached that ensure fairness at the individual level and 
accountability at the political level”). 
 22. Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule Making: A 
Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 354 (2005). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States . . . .”). 
 24. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).  
 25. Id. at 424. 
 26. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 354. 
 27. Id. at 360–61; see also Mary C. Dollarhide, Note, Surrogate Rule Making: Problems and 
Possibilities Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1039 (1988) 
(“Lobbyists are able to anticipate rules before they are officially proposed by agencies and can work 
fast to secure their interests via industrial compromises, self-regulation, or agency lobbying. Lobbyists, 
therefore, have much greater potential for influencing the development of substantive rules than do 
most public interest groups. This notion of agency courting is borne out by studies showing that public 
participation routinely is exceeded by the lobbying efforts of regulated industries.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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It is difficult to obtain a precise accounting of the amount and extent of 
rulemaking activities that are being outsourced to the private sector today. 
The central repository for federal procurement data indicates that it is 
happening.
28
 At least three private firms—Rulemaking Services, LLC, ICF 
International (“ICF”), and The Regulatory Group, Inc. (“TRG”)—are 
ready examples. Tens of thousands of tax dollars have been awarded to 
Rulemaking Services
29
 for tasks that include “Regulatory Studies” and 
“Policy Review/Development Services.”30 The company describes its staff 
as “expert drafters” of “proposed rules, final rules, interim final rules, 
notices, and other rulemaking documents for federal agencies.”31 For the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), in particular, it provides “support 
for all of VA’s rulemaking activities, including drafting and reviewing 
rulemaking documents, preparing VA responses to legislative proposals, 
preparing legal opinions, and representing VA in litigation.”32 Rulemaking 
Services attributes its “considerable success” to working “directly with 
agency officials to produce documents that accurately reflect agency 
thinking.”33 
For its part,
 
ICF
34
 offers “a full range of services to assist clients who 
develop, promulgate, and implement regulations,” including “clear and 
 
 
 28. See FPDS-NG FAQ, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM, https://www.fpds.gov/wiki/ 
index.php/FPDS-NG_FAQ (last visted Oct. 30, 2015) (describing the federal contract data that must 
be reported to the Federal Procurement Data System (“FPDS”)). 
 29. See FPDS-NG ezSearch, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM, https://www.fpds.gov/ 
ezsearch/search.do?indexName=awardfull&templateName=1.4.4&s=FPDSNG.COM&q=%22rulemak
ing+services+limited+liability+company%22 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Rulemaking Services, LLC, RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/ 
index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). Numerous scholars have discussed how federal agencies 
outsource rulemaking functions. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the 
Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 739 
(2014) (discussing how thousands of regulatory standards are incorporated by reference in the Federal 
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations and are available only by request to private standards 
drafters at a nontrivial price); Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont 
Yankee II, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 928 (2007) (“The use of consultants to prepare rules for 
review has become a common practice.”); David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New 
Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 63 (2013) (discussing the outsourcing of international 
policymaking). 
 32. About Us, RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/about.htm (last 
visited May 7, 2016).  
 33. Rulemaking Services, LLC, RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/ 
index.html (last visited May 7, 2016).   
 34. The president of Rulemaking Services, LLC previously worked at ICF. About Us, 
RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/about.htm (last visited May 7, 2016). He 
is also a former director of the office of regulatory law in the Office of General Counsel at the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs. Thomas O. Gessel, The Frustration of Informal Rulemaking, READ 
PERIODICALS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.readperiodicals.com/201104/2317013711.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/5
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precise drafting, defensible and transparent analysis, . . . and balancing 
certainty and predictability with the need to promote innovation.”35 ICF 
claims to have expertise reviewing new legislation; analyzing regulatory 
issues and options; estimating the economic, environmental, and business 
impacts of proposed regulations; “supporting the development of proposed 
and final rulemakings”; summarizing and analyzing public comments on 
agencies’ behalf; facilitating public involvement in the rulemaking 
process; developing “implementation plans, communications strategies, 
and training and outreach programs” for federal clients; and “preparing 
retrospective analyses of existing rules.”36 
Located in Arlington, Virginia, TRG has provided similar services to 
federal agencies since 1980, including drafting notices of proposed 
rulemaking and final rules, analyzing public comments, drafting agency 
guidance, and training agency employees on “regulation writing.”37 
Assuming TRG’s website accurately represents the work it performs for 
federal agencies, it is hard to see it as anything other than a private arm of 
the federal regulatory apparatus that derives its lawmaking powers from 
Congress.
38
 
The private sector’s influence on environmental policymaking has 
grabbed national headlines in recent years. In November 2010, the 
National Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) and three private sector 
strategists by the names of David Doniger, David Hawkins, and Daniel 
Lashof began drafting a carbon emissions policy “that was aimed at 
slashing planet-warning carbon pollution from the nation’s coal-fired 
power plants.”39 Doniger and Hawkins are private lawyers formerly 
employed by the EPA; Lashof is “a climate scientist who is a fixture on 
 
 
 35. Strategy, Policy Analysis, + Regulatory Development, ICF INT’L, http://www.icfi.com/ 
services/strategy-policy-analysis-regulatory-development (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 36. Id. Among its long list of federal contracts, ICF provides “Other Management Support 
Services” for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. FPDS-NG ezSearch, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA 
SYSTEM, https://www.fpds.gov/ezsearch/search.do?s=FPDSNG.COM&q=rulemaking+PIID%3A%22 
NRCDR0308061%22&indexName=awardfull&templateName=1.4.4 (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
 37. About the Regulatory Group, Inc., THE REG. GROUP, INC., http://www.regulationwriters. 
com/about_us (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 38.  Its clients have included the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Interior, the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the General 
Services Administration—as well as numerous sub-agencies, such as the Transportation Security 
Adminsitration, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration. 
Consulting Clients, THE REG. GROUP, INC., http://www.regulationwriters.com/consulting_clients (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
 39. Davenport, supra note 5. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Capitol Hill” and chief operating officer of an environmental super PAC.40 
From 2010 to 2012, the three men worked with a team of experts to 
compose a 110-page proposal that sought to effectuate carbon emissions 
goals by “set[ting] different limits for each state.”41 In late 2012, they 
presented their completed proposal to a number of “state regulators, 
electric utilities, [and] executives.”42 Mr. Doniger also “briefed . . . the 
E.P.A. and Mr. Obama’s senior climate adviser at the time.”43  
In June of 2013, six months after the group circulated their proposal, 
President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum directing the EPA to 
issue regulations addressing carbon pollution from existing power plants 
upon “direct engagement with . . . leaders in the power sector, labor 
leaders, non-governmental organizations, other experts, tribal officials, 
other stakeholders, and members of the public, on issues informing the 
design of the program.”44 The memorandum specifically instructed the 
EPA “to issue proposed [greenhouse gas] regulations, or guidelines . . . for 
. . . existing power plants by no later than June 1, 2014,” and “issue final 
. . . regulations, or guidelines . . . by no later than June 1, 2015.”45 In June 
of 2014, the EPA proposed what is now known as the CPP,
46
 a 
controversial 650-page rule to curb power plant emissions under the 
CAA;
47
 it was unveiled in final form in August of 2015.
48
  
Because the proposed CPP incorporated key aspects of the draft 
produced by the NRDC and its advisors, critics assailed it as enabling the 
private sector to “craft[] regulatory policy for the E.P.A.”49 Doniger, 
Hawkins, and Lashof have been described “as seasoned and [as] well 
connected as Washington’s best-paid lobbyists because of their decades of 
 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,533 (July 1, 
2013), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300457/pdf/DCPD-201300457.pdf. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also 
generally Davenport & Baker, supra note 1 (describing the proposed regulation as allowing states to 
choose from a menu of policy options rather than imposing a uniform standard for reducing power 
plant carbon emissions). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2014). 
 48. Jackson, supra note 1. 
 49. Davenport, supra note 5 (quoting Dallas Burtraw, an energy policy expert at Resources for 
the Future, a Washington nonprofit, and Laura Sheehan, a spokesperson for the American Coalition for 
Clean Coal Electricity, a lobbying group). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/5
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experience and the relationships they formed in the capital.”50 For its part, 
the NRDC is “one of the country’s most influential environmental 
groups.”51 In 2009, it had “at least a half-dozen [of its] former employees” 
seated in “prime government positions tasked with writing U.S. climate 
and energy policies.”52 It has received nearly $2 million in grant funding 
from the EPA since.
53
 
In response to reporting by The New York Times,
54
 the House 
Oversight and Government Reform Committee and Senate Environment 
and Public Works Committee Republicans launched an investigation into 
the NRDC’s influence over the EPA, complaining that “NRDC’s 
unprecedented access to high-level EPA officials allowed it to influence 
EPA policy decisions and achieve its own private agenda.”55 The 
Republicans sought documents regarding the NRDC’s involvement in 
drafting the agency’s proposed regulations for carbon emissions from 
existing power plants.
56
 In October of 2014, lawmakers publicly released 
emails from top EPA officials, including Administrator Gina McCarthy, 
which evidenced NRDC’s relationship with EPA dating back to 2011—
two years before the agency opened up the rulemaking for public input.
57
 
In one exchange with Administrator McCarthy, David Doniger attached a 
multi-page presentation showing that the CPP “would achieve reasonable-
cost reductions from the existing fossil power plant fleet on a continuing 
 
 
 50. Id. EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy rejected as “preposterous” any implication that EPA 
staff “‘just cut and pasted’ NRDC’s work ‘and called it a day.’” Erica Martinson, EPA Chief Pans New 
York Times Story, POLITICO (July 10, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/ 
07/epa-chief-pans-ny-times-story-191891.html#disqus_thread. A reporter who broke the story later 
conceded that “[t]he task of writing [the regulatory] language [fell] chiefly on the shoulders of . . . the 
agency’s senior counsel.” Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Staff Struggling to Create Pollution Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/us/epa-staff-struggling-to-create-rule-
limiting-carbon-emissions.html?_r=0. 
 51. Darren Samuelsohn, Environmental Policy: ‘NRDC Mafia’ Finding Homes on Hill, in EPA, 
E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/stories/75217. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, House Oversight, Senate EPW 
Launch Investigation into Improper NRDC Influence over EPA (Sept. 2, 2014), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/release/house-oversight-senate-epw-launch-investigation-improper-nrdc-
influence-epa/. 
 54. See Letter from H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform and S. Environment and Public 
Works Comm. to Gina McCarthy, Administrator, U.S. EPA 1 (Sept. 2, 2014), available at 
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Joint-LTE-to-EPA-RE-NRDC-9.2.14.pdf. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 3. 
 57. Coral Davenport, Republicans to Investigate Environmental Group’s Influence on Carbon 
Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/us/republicans-to-investigate-
environmental-groups-influence-on-carbon-rule.html?_r=0. 
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basis.”58 McCarthy agreed to review it and schedule a time for Doniger to 
brief her as, she reportedly commented, “I would never say no to a 
meeting with you.”59 
To be sure, the CPP went through multiple phases of agency review 
before finding its way into the Federal Register. The EPA’s analysts and 
experts sought input from hundreds of groups, “including environmental 
advocates, state regulators, electric utilities and the coal industry.”60 Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),61 the EPA was required to 
consider the additional public input collected during the comment period.
62
 
Thus, as Joseph Siegel has observed, the government “retain[ed] ultimate 
authority to impose its own solutions using traditional processes.”63 
Reviewing and responding to public comments on a rule drafted by the 
private sector is substantively different from controlling the content of a 
legislative rule—and thus the formulation of policy—from its inception, 
however. When a private party crafts the legal basis for a rule, it is 
impossible to know “whether this statutory interpretation represented a 
position that the agency would have come to on its own—much less one 
that embodied an application of the agency’s putative legal expertise.”64 
Moreover, a separation of powers concern arises when “the exercise of 
public power, and the creation of public policy, [is conducted] by an entity 
without democratic credentials or direct political accountability.”65 To be 
sure, there is no clear dividing line between regulators’ consideration of 
legitimate on- or off-the-record lobbying and their offloading of 
policymaking functions in a manner that is constitutionally suspect. But as 
the CPP irregularities demonstrate, courts and lawmakers can no longer 
 
 
 58. Bruce Alpert, Sen. David Vitter: EPA Emails Show ‘Cozy Relationship’ with Environmental 
Group, NOLA.COM (Oct. 14, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/10/ 
sen_david_vitter_epa_emails_sh.html. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Davenport, supra note 5. 
 61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–596 (2014). 
 62. Id. § 553. Executive Order 13563 also requires that, “[b]efore issuing a notice of proposed 
rulemaking, each agency . . . shall seek the views of those who are likely to be affected, including 
those who are likely to benefit from and those who are potentially subject to such rulemaking.” Exec. 
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,822 (Jan. 18, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 63. Joseph A. Siegel, Collaborative Decision Making on Climate Change in the Federal 
Government, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 263 (2009); see also id. at 261 (defining collaborative 
decisionmaking as including processes “where agreement is sought and decisions are made with the 
government” and noting that it is sometimes referred to as “stake-holder involvement, public 
involvement, public participation, public-private partnership, deliberative democracy, constructive 
engagement, and collaborative problem solving”). 
 64. Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference Apply?, 
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1110 (2000). 
 65. Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 191 (2000). 
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ignore the constitutional implications of private sector rulemaking. A new 
paradigm for thinking about the relationship between the public and the 
private sectors is needed to facilitate the development of law around this 
overlooked issue. 
B. A Constitutional Policymaking Continuum 
Because the Constitution only applies to state action,
66
 the 
government’s use of private sources to conduct its work evades the 
doctrinal scrutiny that would otherwise operate to preserve normative 
government values such as public accountability, legitimacy, transparency, 
and rational decisionmaking.
67
 
The primary means available for keeping private actors who exercise 
public functions within constitutional constraints is the state action 
doctrine.
68
 In the words of the Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment 
“affords no shield” against private conduct, “no matter how unfair that 
conduct may be.”69 As a consequence, the state action doctrine treats 
private parties as government actors in suits brought by individual 
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief or damages for violations of their 
constitutional rights.
70
 For many reasons, securing a ruling that a private 
actor is a state actor for purposes of constitutional liability is 
extraordinarily difficult.
71
 The Supreme Court itself has quipped that 
“[w]hat is ‘private’ action and what is ‘state’ action is not always easy to 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984). 
 67. See Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 485, 486 (2004) (discussing various theories that account for why the Constitution 
ensures legitimacy or “respect-worthiness”); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the 
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42 (1995) (discussing accountability to the electorate as a “key 
consideration” underlying the Constitution’s design); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: 
Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 626 
(2009) (arguing that the Constitution’s drafters had “a strong preference for rational, deliberate 
decision making over making choices based on feelings or intuition” that was widely accepted in 
contemporary culture); Katherine Clark Harris, Note, The Statement and Account Clause: A Forgotten 
Constitutional Mandate for Federal Reporting, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 505, 513 (2014) (observing 
that “Madison also held the strong belief that transparency was the primary means by which the 
federal government is held accountable to the people”). 
 68. Metzger, supra note 20, at 1410. 
 69. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); see also generally Sheila S. Kennedy, When 
Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 209 (2001) (discussing U.S CONST. amend. XIV, which extended the Bill of 
Rights to the States). 
 70. Metzger, supra note 20, at 1367.  
 71. See id. at 1421 (observing that “current state action doctrine is significantly underinclusive 
and ill-equipped to identify and thereby control private exercises of government power”). 
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determine.”72 Rather, a court’s role is to “sift[] facts and weigh[] 
circumstances” in individual cases,73 which leaves a dizzying array of 
outcomes with few common threads.  
Moreover, the state action doctrine places an agency’s decision to hand 
off government functions to private parties beyond constitutional scrutiny. 
It approaches judicial review of public-private partnerships from the 
vantage point of the private sector, to which structural constitutional 
norms do not apply. A case for state action begins with the assumption 
that a person or entity exercising government power is purely private. The 
doctrine asks whether, by assuming duties under the government’s control, 
the actor morphs from private to public status.
74
 In theory, government 
control over a private actor can become so strong that it transforms into a 
state actor encumbered by constitutional liability. In the majority of cases, 
government powers delegated to private parties are exercised extra-
constitutionally because the test for state action is so difficult to satisfy. As 
a result, norms of constitutional structure do not apply to constrain private 
actors’ exercise of government functions.75 
By contrast, the law governing Congress’s ability to create quasi-
private entities with government powers begins from the vantage point of 
the government actor operating within the boundaries of the 
Constitution.
76
 Cases addressing the constitutionality of independent 
agencies inescapably contend with principles of proper constitutional 
design.
77
 If an entity is created as part of the legislative process, it cannot 
shed its public status under the Constitution—regardless of congressional 
attempts to decrease the level of government influence over it. For 
 
 
 72. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); see also Louis Michael Seidman, The State 
Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 391 (1993) (“No area of constitutional law is more 
confusing and contradictory than state action.”). 
 73. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
 74. Gillian Metzger summarizes the state action doctrine as having two prongs:  
[F]irst, whether “the [challenged] deprivation . . . [was] caused by the exercise of some right 
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person 
for whom the State is responsible”; and second, whether “the party charged with the 
deprivation . . . [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”  
Metzger, supra note 20, at 1412 (alterations in original) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). Professor Metzger notes that, because the first prong is easily satisfied, the key 
step is the second, which is “often alternatively characterized as determining whether ‘there is a 
sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action.’” Id. at 1412 & n.149 (quoting 
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)). 
 75. See Brown, supra note 8, at 507–12. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (assessing the constitutionality of 
the independent counsel statute under Article II). 
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example, although Amtrak was legislatively established as a for-profit 
corporation, the Supreme Court rejected Congress’s attempt to relieve 
“what the Constitution regards as the Government” of its constitutional 
obligations by simply deeming Amtrak “private” in the enabling statute.78  
The Court would be similarly hard-pressed under prevailing law to 
sanction a congressional attempt to create a private consulting corporation 
and give it full power to implement a statute extra-constitutionally. In the 
wake of the 2001 Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress created an 
independent agency with a novel structure—the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”)—and gave it primary 
responsibility for devising and enforcing auditing standards for the 
accounting industry.
79
 The PCAOB promulgates rules; inspects and 
investigates firms for violations of federal securities laws; imposes 
censures, suspensions, and monetary fines; and enjoys subpoena authority, 
official immunity from liability, and privileges from third party 
discovery.
80
 Yet Congress exempted the PCAOB from the definition of 
“agency” for purposes of the APA,81 empowered the SEC—not the 
President—to appoint and remove the PCAOB’s five members, and 
authorized removal by the SEC only “for good cause shown” after a 
hearing on the record.
82
 Congress also made the PCAOB uniquely 
independent of legislative pressures by allowing it to fund itself through 
the collection of fees,
83
 to set its own budget,
84
 and to afford its members a 
private sector pay scale with salaries that substantially exceed that of the 
President himself.
85
  
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,
86
 the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the statute
87
 that 
rendered the PCAOB subject to removal for cause by the SEC. It held that 
 
 
 78. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995). 
 79. See Stephen Labaton, A Push to Fix the Fix on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/weekinreview/17labaton.html?_r=0 (describing events leading up 
to the creation of the PCAOB). 
 80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(c), 7215 (2014); see also generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo 
with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 
(2005). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (“The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States 
. . . .”). The APA applies only to entities that constitute an “agency,” which it defines as “authorit[ies] 
of the Government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2014). 
 82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217. 
 83. See id. § 7219(c)(1) (providing for the collection of “accounting support fees”). 
 84. Id. § 7211(c)(7). 
 85. See id. §§ 7211(f)(4), 7219. 
 86. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 87. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
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the statute’s creation of “dual for-cause limitations on the removal of 
Board members contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers”88 
because the President is unable to “hold the Commission fully accountable 
for the Board’s conduct, to the same extent that he may hold the 
Commission accountable for everything else that it does.”89 Had Congress 
instead authorized the SEC to devise standards for the accounting industry, 
and the SEC subsequently hired a private party to craft them, the SEC’s 
relationship with that private party would not have triggered anything 
approaching the constitutional scrutiny that the PCAOB received.
90
 For the 
same policy reasons that the Court found the PCAOB’s structure 
insupportable, it should develop constitutional doctrine to address this 
blind spot, as well.  
To illustrate the paradox, suppose a private consulting group with 
expertise in environmental policy (call it “PCC”) contracts with the EPA 
to craft a regulation under the CAA to cut carbon emissions from power 
plants over the next 15 years. Although PCC’s initial contract with the 
EPA only covers the drafting of a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(“NPRM”), the EPA later broadens the scope of work to include 
solicitation and analysis of public comments; private meetings with 
lobbyists, members of Congress, and public interest groups to solicit input; 
revisions to the NPRM; and drafting of the final rule. The PCC is also 
responsible for ensuring the EPA has complied with the myriad other 
federal statutes that encumber notice and comment rulemaking under the 
APA,
91
 such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
92
 the Paperwork Reduction 
Act,
93
 the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,
94
 the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,
95
 and numerous Executive Orders 
affecting rulemaking.
96
  
PCC’s scope of work would likely violate guidelines for the 
competitive outsourcing of federal jobs, which the Office of Management 
 
 
 88. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492. 
 89. Id. at 496. 
 90.  See Metzger, supra note 20, at 1400 (“A fundamental tenet of constitutional law posits an 
‘essential dichotomy’ between public and private, with only public or government actors being subject 
to constitutional restraints.”). 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2014). 
 92. Id. §§ 601–612. 
 93. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2014). 
 94. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1571 (2014). 
 95. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 864 (1996). 
 96. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 
323 (1986) (requiring OMB oversight of the regulatory process through its Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521. 
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and Budget issued in 1976.
97
 Circular A-76 forbids the outsourcing of 
“inherently governmental” functions, which it defines to include activities 
that determine, protect, or advance US interests by military action or 
contract management; that significantly affect the life, liberty, or property 
of private persons; or that exert ultimate control over the disposition of 
federal property.
98
 But the EPA could erroneously classify PCC’s work 
under Circular A-76, and judicial review of that decision is largely 
unavailable.
99
 And because Congress did not create PCC, there would be 
no judicial review of its EPA contract for compliance with the separation 
of powers and related principles of constitutional structure.  
The paradox created by the foregoing scenario—that important 
constitutional values come into play only when Congress attempts to 
privatize government, and not when an agency does—stems from the 
futile line-drawing that underlies prevailing doctrine as to the 
Constitution’s scope. A better and more realistic approach would 
recognize that the public and private sectors intersect in myriad and 
complex ways, and that the Constitution’s relevance should not hinge on 
which branch of government—Congress or the executive—established the 
public-private partnership in question. In fact, given that Congress has the 
constitutional power to “make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution . . . [all] powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department 
or officer thereof,”100 one would expect that its decisions about what kind 
of entity is best situated to implement its legislative mandates would 
receive relatively less—not more stringent—constitutional scrutiny.  
The recognition that government lies along a constitutional continuum 
and not along a sharp public-private divide is of immense practical 
importance. In addition to independent agencies and wholly-owned 
government corporations, the federal government umbrella includes 
numerous other entities, such as corporations partly-owned by the federal 
government, federally-chartered corporations that are privately owned,
101
 
 
 
 97. Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310, 326 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter “GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT”] (citing OMB, Circular A-76, Attachment A, Part B).  
 98. Verkuil, supra note 97, at 326. An agency’s decision of what is “inherently governmental” is 
effectively not reviewable. VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 126. Although an “interested party” can lodge a 
legal challenge, Article III standing problems can preclude judicial review. 
 99. See VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 128.  
 100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 101. Beermann, supra note 16, at 1517; see also generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, 
Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1228–31 (2000) (“While they share similar characteristics with the independent agencies 
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government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) like Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac,
102
 self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) such as the New York 
Stock Exchange,
103
 as well as numerous offices, boards, commissions, and 
foundations with all different sorts of government ties.
104
 This impressive 
collection of quasi-government establishments is characterized by varying 
degrees of executive branch control and accountability; while GSEs are 
not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), for example, 
certain—but not all—federal corporations are treated as agencies within 
the meaning of the APA.
105
  
If the various arrangements by which the many public, private, and 
quasi-public actors exercising governmental power are plotted on a 
constitutional graph or continuum rather than within separate public and 
private spaces, it becomes immediately evident that no crisp line exists 
between the public and the private spheres. To be sure, cabinet-level 
agencies would reside on one end of this continuum and purely private 
actors with no government affiliations on the other. But between those 
 
 
. . . [public corporations’] corporate structure is the feature that sets them apart from the independent 
agency.”). 
 102. A government sponsored enterprise “is a federally chartered, privately owned, privately 
managed financial institution that has only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bond-
market investors perceive as implicitly backed by the federal government.” Richard Scott Carnell, 
Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 570 (2005). 
 103. Private entities self-regulate through “industrial codes and product standards,” which 
agencies incorporate in government regulations. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government 
Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 401 (2003). For its part, the SEC has repeatedly stated that “as a 
general matter, self-regulatory organizations . . . are not state actors and thus are not subject to the 
Constitution’s due process requirements.” In the Matter of Timothy H. Emerson, Jr. for Review of 
Action Taken by FINRA, Exchange Act Release No. 60,328 (July 17, 2009), at 11; see also William I. 
Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction Among Securities Regulators in 
the U.S. Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727, 746 (2004) (noting that 
“courts have acknowledged the government’s symbiotic relationship with the SROs in their joint 
regulation of the securities markets; and yet they have been unwilling to extend the protections of the 
Constitution to parties adversely affected by the SROs’ activities”).  
 104. Breger & Edles, supra note 101, at 1199; see also generally id. at 1228–34 (discussing 
government corporations and GSEs generally). 
 105. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2014); Breger & Edles, supra note 101, at 1229–30; see also Shapiro, supra 
note 103, at 390. 
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poles lies a vast array of “quasi” entities.106 A rough illustration of such a 
normative continuum is as follows:
107
 
 
This visual depiction of the relationship between public and private 
actors engaged in identical federal regulatory work demonstrates that all 
such actors bear a relationship to the structural Constitution. The 
separation of powers exists to protect individual liberty, which remains at 
risk if the power of the people is exercised by biased, unaccountable 
individuals. There is no point along the continuum at which the public 
nature of the functions performed magically disappears or becomes 
constitutionally insignificant. The continuum thus necessitates a realistic 
assessment of whether normative values of good government—grounded 
in the separation of powers—are preserved in the array of quasi-private 
governmental structures that dot the federal government today. It also 
highlights a blind spot in prevailing constitutional doctrine—one that 
 
 
 106. In his dissenting opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, Justice Breyer emphasized that 
federal statutes broadly delegate a host of powers and responsibilities to government officials and that 
“[t]hose statutes create a host of different organizational structures.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 520–21 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He explained:  
[S]ometimes they vest it in multimember or multiagency task groups; sometimes they vest it 
in commissions or advisory committees made up of members of more than one branch; 
sometimes they divide it among groups of departments, commissions, bureaus, divisions, and 
administrators; and sometimes they permit state or local governments to participate as well.  
Id. at 521 (citations omitted). In making the point that “it is not surprising that administrative units 
comes in many different shapes and sizes,” Justice Breyer did not mention that such administrative 
units increasingly include private companies. Id. 
 107. The point here is to illustrate the continuum concept, not commit to a particular order or 
comprehensiveness of relationships. See Brown, supra note 8, at 510–11, 511 n.112; cf. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324 (2002) (describing a continuum of 
rulemaking that is classified by the amount of governmental participation involved, with one end 
reflecting “rules of law originated and put into force by sovereign governments” and “rules that are 
adopted entirely by private actors” at the other). 
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shrouds the private sector in an intellectually corrupt veil of extra-
constitutionality.
108
  
C. Baseline Values 
So far, this Article has argued that the Court’s treatment of private 
parties as per se operating outside the scope of the Constitution—
regardless of the governmental nature of their work—leaves unrealized 
important normative values of good government. This Subpart spells out 
what some of those values are—to wit, accountability, transparency, 
legitimacy, and rational decisionmaking—and explains how, in contrast to 
their federal counterparts, private actors exercising government power 
systematically evade them. 
1. Accountability  
A central component of governance is political accountability. To be 
accountable is to be answerable, explainable, and reckoning for one’s 
actions.
109
 Under the Constitution, government accountability presumes 
that the source of federal power—the people—must have some say in how 
it is exercised.
110
 The Framers’ decision to create a unitary executive 
underscores the importance of accountability to the public in the 
Constitution’s structure.111 Madison explained in Federalist No. 37 that 
“[t]he genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . not only that all 
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted [sic] 
with it should be kept in dependence on the people.”112 For government 
 
 
 108. See Brown, supra note 8, at 511–12. 
 109.  WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 50 (1989). 
 110. See Brown, supra note 21, at 1370. 
 111. Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsels of the Federal Government: The 
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 OP. O.L.C. 124, 135 
(1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Separation of Powers]. 
 112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 181 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). Public 
accountability has been described further as encompassing the: 
sense of individual responsibility and concern for the public interest expected from public 
servants[,] . . . the various institutional checks and balances by which democracies seek to 
control the actions of the governments[,] . . . the extent to which governments pursue the 
wishes or needs of their citizens . . . regardless of whether they are induced to do so through 
processes of authoritative exchange and control[,] . . . [and] the public discussion between 
citizens on which democracies depend . . . . 
Richard Mulgan, ‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 556 (2000).  
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actors, “the key accountability relationships . . . are those between the 
citizens and the holders of public office.”113 
Moreover, as Madison famously stated in Federalist No. 51, the system 
of separated powers was designed so that “[a]mbition must be made to 
counteract ambition.”114 Madison described the underlying “policy” of the 
separation of powers as “divid[ing] and arrang[ing] the several offices in 
such a manner as that each may be a check on the other.”115 Because the 
legislature posed a risk of amassing too much power, it was split into two 
houses “on [the] ground that each House will keep the other in check.”116 
Individual members of Congress do not always make decisions for the 
good of the nation as a whole, and can become mired in internal politics 
that prompt legislation to serve individual ends. Lawmaking by Congress 
is checked through the presidential veto and judicial review. Although the 
unitary President can act decisively without becoming enmeshed in 
internal politics, he can also act arbitrarily, and as such his power is 
limited to the veto, commanding armies, negotiating treaties, and 
nominating public officials.
117
 
The Constitution does not create an administrative bureaucracy, and 
unlike Congress, agencies occupy quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and 
executive postures without any direct electoral check.
118
 Thus, numerous 
scholars have occupied themselves with questions of accountability within 
the administrative state.
119
 The constitutional and statutory law bearing on 
the attenuated political accountability for executive branch agencies, 
moreover, is deep. In the New Deal era, the Supreme Court famously 
thwarted congressional attempts to delegate its Article I legislative power 
to the executive branch on the rationale that Congress had set “no criterion 
 
 
 113. Mulgan, supra note 112, at 556. 
 114.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 115. Id. 
 116. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 
(James Madison)). 
 117. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 305 (2009). 
 118. Executive Departments are mentioned in the Opinions Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 
(“[The President] may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices . . . .”); see also id. 
(“[Executive] [a]ppointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law . . . .”). 
 119. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1747–50, 
1754 (2009) (describing debate between presidential “unitarians” who “emphasize accountability as an 
important constitutional principle” and others who believe that the Constitution “adopts a framework 
of joint, rather than single or simple accountability” and analyzing the “major functional question 
regarding the administrative state,” in other words, “whether it permits end-runs around the 
accountability protections that would apply were Congress or the other named branches performing the 
activities delegated to it”). 
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to govern the President’s course.”120 Yet it swiftly established that 
Congress has the constitutional authority to delegate its legislative power 
to the executive branch so long as its enabling legislation includes an 
“intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of discretion.121  
For its part, Congress responded to public concern over the 
accountability of New Deal agencies
122
 by enacting the APA in 1946.
123
 
The APA remains the primary statutory source for public disclosure, 
public involvement in rulemaking, and judicial review of administrative 
decision-making today.
124
 William Funk explains that, like the 
Constitution, the APA “does not indicate a rejection of the need for strong 
government for the proper functioning of modern society, but rather a 
healthy disrespect for the motives and abilities of men placed in power.”125 
The APA “uses procedural mechanisms to check the power granted,” such 
as mandatory notice of proposed rules and the solicitation and 
consideration of public comments, “while not denying the need for the 
power.”126 Thus, much like the Constitution, the APA advances normative 
values of good government, including accountability to the political 
branches (and thus to the public), fairness, transparency, regularity, 
expertise, and reasoned decisionmaking.
127
 The statute has remained 
largely untouched since its passage, with the Supreme Court taking up the 
task of construing its provisions in a manner that effectuates these public 
policy objectives.
128
 
 
 
 120. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 121.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
 122. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1590–91 (1996). 
 123. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2014). 
 124. Id. The APA’s basic purposes are (1) “[t]o require agencies to keep the public currently 
informed of their organization, procedures and rules”; (2) “to provide for public participation in the 
rule making process”; (3) “to prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking [and 
adjudication]”; and (4) “to restate the law of judicial review.” ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947). 
 125. William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotation and the Public 
Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 90 (1987) (calling the APA “a compromise 
piece of legislation designed to constrain the discretion of agencies while legitimating their remaining 
discretion through procedural regularity and judicial oversight”).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 693 (2007). 
 128. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81, 81–82 
(1996) (noting that the APA “has proven to be remarkably durable”). 
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After a second wave of government expansion in the early 1970s,
129
 
government began to shift from bureaucratic administration to business-
like management, with private parties functioning as “the new agents of 
the state.”130 In fiscal year 2016 alone, the federal government paid over 
$113 billion to private contractors,
131
 which have been known to formulate 
federal policy, interpret laws, administer foreign aid, manage nuclear 
weapons sites, interrogate detainees, and control borders.
132
 A new canon 
of privatization scholarship emerged, with some commentators 
“embrac[ing] self-regulation”133 and others decrying the privatization trend 
as deeply problematic.
134
  
Privatization has triggered novel questions of “accountability, and the 
extent to which delegation adequately constrains administrative action 
within the rule of law.”135 Yet unlike the law governing federal agencies, 
constitutional doctrine has not kept apace with privatization. The post-
New Deal Court struck down a number of statutory delegations of 
legislative power to private hands,
136
 only to later uphold legislation 
authorizing private individuals to engage in regulatory efforts on the 
rationale that public officials ultimately retained review authority.
137
 The 
 
 
 129. R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” Is Not Our Central 
Problem and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 772 (2014) (referencing 
“the expansion of the government agenda in the 1960s and 1970s”). 
 130. Avishai Benish, Outsourcing, Discretion, and Administrative Justice: Exploring the 
Acceptability of Privatized Decision Making 3 (Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, 
Working Paper No. 64, 2014). 
 131. See Overview of Awards—FY 2016, USA SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/transpa 
rency/Pages/OverviewOfAwards.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2016). 
 132. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem 
of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 138 (2005) (discussing the 
privatization of foreign affairs); Freeman, supra note 15, at 551–52 (discussing the pervasiveness of 
private actors in “regulation, service provision, policy design, and implementation”). 
 133. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the 
Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 272 
(describing “the legal scholarship of the new governance”).  
 134. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, ‘We Can’t Spy . . . If We Can’t Buy!’: The Privatization of 
Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions,’ 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1055, 1056–57 (2008) (noting that controversy over private military and security companies coalesces 
around cost, self-dealing, corruption, accountability, and secrecy); Martha Minow, Outsourcing 
Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 97, at 110–27 (2009) (elaborating on same); VERKUIL, 
supra note 13, at 1 (“The government exercises sovereign powers. When those powers are delegated to 
outsiders, the capacity to govern is undermined.”). 
 135. Bingham, supra note 133, at 273.  
 136. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down statute authorizing 
local coal boards to determine coal prices and employee wages and hours). The Court based its 
decision on the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Id. at 297–304. 
 137. See Metzger, supra note 20, at 1438–45. 
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Court has never clarified the nature of government oversight required to 
render a private delegation constitutional. If an agency transfers significant 
governmental authority to a private party, no constitutional doctrine 
addresses whether an official’s “rubber stamp” suffices to render the 
delegation constitutional.
138
 Additionally, private contractors are not 
appointed by the President. The APA, the FOIA, and other process-
oriented statutes apply only to federal agencies.
139
 Private parties under 
contract with the federal government are not subject to the same pay, 
political activity, and labor restrictions that apply to government 
employees.
140
 As a consequence, although private parties exercising 
government functions lie along a constitutional continuum with degrees of 
separation from the President, there are few administrative or 
constitutional law mechanisms establishing their accountability to the 
populace they serve.
141
  
2. Transparency  
A second hallmark of good governance is transparency. To be sure, the 
Constitution contains no public right of access to information regarding 
the activities of government.
142
 But transparency is reflected as a 
normative value in the Constitution’s express requirements that the 
President report on the state of the Union
143
 and that Congress keep a 
“Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same.”144 
Lawmaking takes place in public view; the legislature mediates numerous 
 
 
 138. See generally VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 109–10. The Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel has construed Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 (1976), to hold that “private 
individuals may not determine the policy of the United States, or interpret and apply federal law in any 
way that binds the United States or affects the legal rights of third parties” under the Constitution. 
Constitutional Limits on “Contracting Out” Department of Justice Functions Under OMB Circular A-
76, 14 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 94, 99 (1990). “Properly appointed federal officials must maintain 
both legal and effective control over the direction of United States policy . . . .” Id. 
 139. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2014). 
 140. Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and 
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 338 (2004). 
 141.  See David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution and 
Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 104–05 (2005). 
 142. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 932 (2006); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 
(1978) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a 
right of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s 
control.”). Adam Samaha observes, however, that “[t]hree justices dissented [in Houchins], stressing 
their opposition to total denial of public access to information about jail operations.” Samaha, supra, at 
942 n.151 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 29–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
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competing interests and must reach a compromise in order to move 
forward.  
First Amendment jurisprudence supports the notion that without 
transparency, responsive and adaptive government cannot exist. It is “well 
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information 
and ideas.”145 The Court has characterized the First Amendment as 
“assur[ing] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.”146 The ability of the 
people to speak and debate freely renders government responsive and 
accountable to the people.
147
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly construed 
the Free Speech Clause as enabling the citizenry to correct government 
through wide-open debate.
148
  
Despite the normative value placed on transparency under the 
Constitution, the public has limited access to information revealing the full 
extent of private sector influence on government. Jody Freeman and 
Martha Minow describe federal contracts made “literally off the books.”149 
 
 
 145. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“[W]here a speaker exists, . . . the 
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear from 
the decided cases.”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (“The public-official rule 
protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public 
officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is 
relevant.”); Samaha, supra note 142, at 941 (footnotes omitted) (“One can logically read the 
Amendment as promoting a system of communication in which audiences possess interests in parity 
with speakers. In fact, the Court had long accepted listeners’ First Amendment interests. And the 
judiciary was indicating that ‘political speech’ and ‘robust’ debate on ‘public issues’ were at the core 
of its concerns.”). 
 146. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (citing a 1774 letter by the Continental 
Congress in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)); accord Mills, 384 U.S. at 
218–19. 
 147. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); Mills, 384 U.S. at 219; cf. Gravel 
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640–41 (1972). 
 148. See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 640–41 (observing that the First Amendment protects not just 
speakers but listeners—a protection that aids public access to information about government and thus 
its ability to hold government accountable); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) 
(observing that “free political discussion” serves “the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the 
security of the Republic, [which] is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system”); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–
76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (noting that the First Amendment protects “uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open” dissemination of ideas because public debate ensures that government can be 
changed). 
 149. Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 97, at 1, 3. 
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Although Acquisition.gov
150
 is the leading public website for government 
contracting information, its information is coded for contractors, not lay 
citizens, and does not include a central repository of federal contracting 
documents.
151
  
Administrative law places no public disclosure requirements on private 
contractors.
152
 The APA’s FOIA provisions do not cover records related to 
the private sector’s federal government work.153 Nor does the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”)154 apply to require disclosure of 
information regarding their role in government policymaking. In 2001, 
then-Vice President Dick Cheney met with big oil companies to formulate 
national energy policy that was “designed to help the private sector, and, 
as necessary and appropriate, State and local governments,” as well as to 
“promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production 
and distribution of energy for the future.”155 As with the CPP, parts of that 
effort under President George W. Bush “became law and parts . . . are still 
being debated.”156 Critics claimed that the task force produced a package 
of “incentives for the energy industry . . . at the expense of the 
environment and public health.”157  
Environmental and citizen groups sued the Vice President under the 
FACA, seeking disclosure of the participants’ identities and meeting 
minutes. The statute requires entities qualifying as “advisory committees” 
to make public the “records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, 
working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents which were 
made available to or prepared for or by” the committees.158 The Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the FACA did not apply to Cheney’s 
so-called “task force” members because “there is nothing to indicate that 
 
 
 150. ACQUISITION.GOV, https://www.acquisition.gov (last updated Mar. 16, 2016). 
 151. See id. 
 152. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 141, at 104. 
 153. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89–554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2014)); see also VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 90 (noting that the FOIA is a “force for 
public legitimacy” that does not apply to documents held by private contractors). 
 154. 5 U.S.C. App. § 2 (2014). 
 155. Eric Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the Cloistering of the Cheney Energy Task 
Force, 16 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 329, 330 (2008) (quoting NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, 
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR 
AMERICA’S FUTURE viii (2001)).  
 156. Dana Milbank & Justin Blum, Document Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/15/ 
AR2005111501842.html. 
 157. Press Release, Nat’l Res. Defense Council, NRDC Offers Responsible Alternative to Bush 
Energy Plan (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressReleases/010517.asp. 
 158. 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(b) (2014). 
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non-federal employees had a right to vote . . . or exercise a veto.”159 The 
incident demonstrates that, for entities residing at the private end of the 
constitutional policymaking continuum, achieving public transparency is a 
tenuous proposition, regardless of the political proclivities of the person in 
the White House—and even if identical tasks performed by federal 
employees would be subject to public disclosure requirements. 
3. Legitimacy 
A third aspect of good government is legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to 
the source or “justification of a government’s authority to rule over its 
people.”160 “[G]overnment is said to be ‘legitimate’ if the people to whom 
its orders are directed believe that the structure, procedures, acts, 
decisions, policies, officials, or leaders of government possess the quality 
of ‘rightness,’ propriety, or moral goodness—the right, in short, to make 
binding rules.”161 Legitimacy is related to how successful government is at 
making a “normative case” for a particular policy or decision.162 It is 
“whatever is added to convert power into authority,” but “also can refer to 
perceptions: whether there is a belief that something is okay.”163  
The legitimacy of the United States government derives from its 
constitutional authority and the democratic mandates of Congress and the 
sitting President.
164
 Congress has the power to make laws and is 
accountable for the results at the voting booth. The Appointments Clause 
renders the President and his appointees accountable for the execution of 
the laws; Senate confirmation of the President’s appointments triggers 
public awareness.
165
 Furthermore, the federal government’s legitimacy 
rests on the belief that public servants are susceptible to political—and 
 
 
 159. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 160. Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New 
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 126 (2000). 
 161. ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 41 (2d ed. 1970); see also Daniel 
Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 n.29 (1999).  
 162. Ku, supra note 160, at 126. 
 163. Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 323. 
 164. Michael Herz, Some Thoughts on Judicial Review and Collaborative Governance, 2009 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 361, 365–66. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 2009). 
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thus electoral—influence166 and that they are not financially motivated to 
achieve certain outcomes.
167
  
Neither the formal mandates of constitutional structure nor the 
democratic process legitimates private parties’ exercise of public 
functions. The private sector is not technically bound by the Constitution 
(with the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment) and its members are not 
democratically elected. And unlike government actors, private sector 
employees are not motivated to act for the primary benefit of the public 
good but are charged with maximizing profits for their employers.
168
 
Inevitably, conflicts of interest impact private actors’ ability to champion 
the objectives of good government over the need to generate revenue for 
their stakeholders. A private corporation hired to make individual public 
benefits determinations for a fixed contract price, for example, will feel 
pressure to truncate its adjudication methods to cut costs—even if that 
means a less accurate or fair process for individual claimants.  
Moreover, government contractors are not within the general purview 
of the federal conflict of interest laws.
169
 Although the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation
170
 governs the process by which the government purchases 
goods and services, its conflict of interest provisions do not take into 
consideration whether a contractor’s aims are “at odds with the ‘public 
interest,’” and its rules can be waived for contracts deemed essential.171 
Thus, even though many private contractors exercise powers identical to 
those of public actors, existing constitutional and statutory law does 
relatively little to foster legitimacy on the private end of the constitutional 
policymaking spectrum.  
 
 
 166. Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
53, 54 (2008). 
 167. Federal criminal laws accordingly prohibit executive branch employees from participating 
personally and substantially in matters that will affect their own financial interests. 18 U.S.C. § 208 
(2014).  
 168. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 185 (2012) (“Corporations’ fiduciary duty to their shareholders requires them 
to breach contracts when doing so would maximize profit.”). 
 169. Jeffrey Lovitky, The Problems of Government Contracting for Consulting Services, 14 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 332, 345 (1983). 
 170. 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2016). 
 171. Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of 
Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 898 (2000) 
(citing Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 48 C.F.R. pt. 2009.5 (1999)). 
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4. Rational Decisionmaking 
Lastly, good governance reflects rational decisionmaking, which is 
inherent in the Constitution’s structure. The first state constitutions 
established strong legislatures that closely represented the people by 
concentrating power in the lower assembly.
172
 Constituents were 
empowered to “‘instruct’ their representatives.”173 As a result, early state 
legislatures were critiqued as captured by “selfish factions and demagogic 
leaders” who “enacted ill-advised laws” at the expense of the public 
good.
174
  
Mistrusting the people’s proclivity towards popular rule by factions, 
the Framers opted instead for a republic, which runs power through a 
small number of wiser government representatives.
175
 Because this 
republic covers an extremely large population, opinions are diverse, 
making it relatively difficult for a majority faction to take hold.
176
 The 
Framers thus “relied on elected representatives to defuse, to compromise, 
and, at best, to prevent the abuse of government power from motives of 
personal self-interest or majoritarian passion.”177 
This nod towards rational decisionmaking is reflected in the fact that 
the APA contains detailed procedural requirements for legislative 
rulemaking and formal adjudication and in the Supreme Court’s 
construction of the statute’s standards for judicial review.178 In Motor 
Vehicles Manufacturers Association of the United States v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
179
 the Court rejected the government’s 
argument for “rational basis” review under the APA, holding instead that 
“the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
 
 
 172. Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint 
Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563, 1581–82 (1997) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 163 (1969)). 
 173. Id. at 1582. 
 174. Id. at 1583; see also Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and 
Epistemic Mappings, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 3–4 
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) [hereinafter “PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY”] (noting early critiques of 
“patronage-based politics”). 
 175. The Founders offered vague definitions of the term “republic” at times. Alexander Hamilton 
defined a republic as a government that “requires that the sense of the majority should prevail,” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009), and James Madison defined 
it as “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 
(James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 177. See Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 
709, 730 (1994). 
 178. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 706 (2014). 
 179. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.”180  
Under outsourcing regimes, contract terms—and not statutory 
procedures for rational decisionmaking—govern private actors’ 
performance. Judicial review for rationality and fairness is virtually non-
existent. Although private tort and contract law might apply to abuses by 
government contractors, immunity defenses stymie lawsuits.
181
 Only the 
government can sue private contractors under the Contract Disputes 
Act.
182
 In addition, agencies can contract out of statutory protections in the 
negotiating process
183
 and often lack the resources or motivation to pursue 
common law remedies.
184
 The False Claims Act
185
 enables qui tam suits to 
recover penalties from private contractors for fraud but contains 
formidable barriers to judicial review.
186
  
The lack of judicial oversight of privatized government is particularly 
acute when federal agencies engage stealth factions of the private sector in 
the policymaking process. In those circumstances, the meager statutory 
frameworks for review of federal contracting decisions do not even apply. 
Moreover, when the government formulates policy alongside a finite 
segment of the community and to the exclusion of other interested groups, 
it undermines the constitutional plan for representative democracy—
heightening the possibility that agencies will become “captured” by 
 
 
 180. Id. at 43 & n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 181. See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immunity to private 
foster care contractor in action under federal disability laws); Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 
152 F.3d 67, 76–77 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity to private insurance company in Medicare 
dispute); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1216, 1228 (2008) (arguing that private contractors should not be immunized for government work 
performed). 
 182. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2014). 
 183. But cf. Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theories and the Failures of Public-Private 
Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2254, 2256 (2013) (arguing a mandatory duty to act in 
furtherance of the public interest should be implied in all government outsourcing contracts and that 
“members of the public for whose benefit the service was being provided—and who are harmed when 
service provision is poor—should be permitted to sue as third-party beneficiaries for breach of the 
public interest duty”); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003) (arguing that contracts should reflect public law values through a process 
of “publicization”). 
 184. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 174, at 83, 97–98 (explaining how both the executive and legislative 
branches may lack the motivation to hold private actors accountable). 
 185. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2014). 
 186. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, 
supra note 97, at 356. 
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factions and abdicate their primary obligation to serve the public good.
187
 
A doctrinal shift is needed to account for the tension that privatized 
government creates within the constitutional policymaking continuum. 
II. DOCTRINAL RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL DISRUPTIONS TO THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
This Part discusses the foundational constitutional doctrine bearing on 
structural disruptions in the separation of powers and highlights an 
anomaly created by agency subdelegations of legislative power to the 
private sector. When Congress delegates its legislative powers, the 
nondelegation doctrine applies to monitor adherence to principles of 
constitutional structure. Yet if agencies—as recipients of such powers—
subdelegate them to private actors, none of the separation of powers 
principles that governed Congress’s initial delegation apply. The other 
doctrinal mechanism for judicial review of “first-order” delegations of 
legislative authority—Chevron and its progeny—similarly fails to account 
for “second-order” delegations of policymaking authority by agencies to 
the private sector. 
A. The Delegation Doctrines 
The nondelegation and private delegation doctrines spring from the 
structural principles underlying the Constitution’s design. The Supreme 
Court stated in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States that the 
Constitution “divide[s] the governmental power into three branches” and 
imposes a rule that “in the actual administration of the government 
Congress . . . should exercise the legislative power, the President . . . the 
executive power, and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power.”188 By 
 
 
 187. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 13 (2014) (Daniel Carpenter & David 
A. Moss eds., 2013) (“Regulatory Capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or 
application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the 
interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.”); Mark C. Niles, On 
the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” 
and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 388 (2002) (describing agency 
capture as “an attempt to promote the ‘private’ interest of the regulated group at the expense of some 
broader interest of the public as a whole, which would otherwise have been the primary concern of the 
regulatory agency”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039, 1052 (1997) (“[C]apture theory . . . suggests that aggressive judicial oversight and 
control of agencies is needed in order to counteract the distortions of the administrative process 
introduced by interest group capture and other pathologies.”). 
 188. 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
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constitutional design, therefore, no single branch can exercise too much 
power over the governed, and each branch operates as a check on the 
power of the other branches.
189
 The Supreme Court has accordingly 
scrutinized legislation creating novel government structures
190
 to ensure 
that no one branch aggrandizes its power at another’s expense191 and that 
executive branch agencies remain susceptible to some measure of 
presidential control.
192
  
The nondelegation doctrine similarly functions to confine 
constitutionally vested legislative power in Congress.
193
 It derives from 
John Locke’s social contract theory, which binds citizens to “the laws 
enacted by democratic legislatures exercising the power delegated to it by 
the people.”194 The Constitution has no inherent powers; “the only 
legitimate fountain of power” derives from the people.195 Thus, only the 
people’s elected representatives may exercise its powers.196 In theory, the 
nondelegation doctrine “ensures to the extent consistent with orderly 
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are 
made by Congress, the branch of our government most responsive to the 
popular will.”197  
 
 
 189. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 
U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (“The ultimate purpose of [the] separation of powers is to protect the liberty and 
security of the governed.”). 
 190. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). 
 191. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–24 (1976). 
 192. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506–07 (2010). 
 193. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The nondelegation doctrine is 
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government. . . . 
Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”); see also Field v. Clark, 
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a 
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution.”). 
 194. Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between 
the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 927 (2006) (citing JOHN LOCKE, 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52–65 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) 
(1690)). 
 195. Flaherty, supra note 172, at 1586 (quoting WOOD, supra note 172, at 550). “[B]y placing 
sovereignty in the people, both liberal theory and the Constitution make the political sovereign the 
source of delegated, not inherent, powers.” Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of 
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 407 (2006). 
 196. See LOCKE, supra note 194, at 74–75. But see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, 
Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2007) (observing that adherents of the 
“prodelegation school” think that Congress can delegate legislative power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and that, “[w]hile Article I, Section 7 outlines one method of making law, it never 
decrees that it is the only means of making law”). 
 197. Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 685 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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The nondelegation doctrine formally emerged in the nineteenth 
century,
198
 reaching its prominence in post-New Deal litigation around the 
propriety of the burgeoning administrative state.
199
 In Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan,
200
 the Court struck down a provision of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”)201 that empowered the President to 
manage a statutory prohibition on interstate shipment of petroleum 
because that Congress had set “no criterion to govern the President’s 
course.”202 In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,203 it found 
unconstitutional another NIRA provision authorizing private trade and 
industrial groups, subject to the President’s approval, to draft codes of fair 
competition governing the sale of chickens.
204
 Congress, the Court 
explained, is “not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential 
legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”205  
Since the NIRA cases, the nondelegation doctrine has failed to fulfill 
its constitutional potential as a means of confining legislative power to the 
Congress, despite its prominence as what Gary Lawson calls “the 
foundation of American representative government.”206 Less than a decade 
later, the Court in Yakus v. United States “completely shifted to valuing 
congressional flexibility and freedom over a strict application of the 
nondelegation doctrine.”207 At issue was a statute delegating to an 
 
 
 198. Initially, the Supreme Court upheld delegations of lawmaking authority in the face of such 
challenges. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 6, 43 (1825) (upholding constitutionality 
of Congress’s delegation to the judiciary the authority to establish procedures for service of process 
and execution of judgments because such power was conferred pursuant to “general provisions to fill 
up the details”); Field, 143 U.S. at 693 (holding that delegation of authority to the President to suspend 
tariffs for imports was constitutional as the President was acting as “the mere agent of the law-making 
department to ascertain and declare the event upon which [Congress’s] expressed will was to take 
effect”); see also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911) (upholding constitutionality of 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the use of federal grazing lands, 
subject to criminal penalties, as the agency “confin[ed] [itself] within the field covered by the statute 
. . . in order to administer the law and carry the statute into effect”). 
 199. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Metzger, supra note 20, at 1438–42 (discussing 
nondelegation cases in the Supreme Court following the New Deal). 
 200. 293 U.S. 388. 
 201. 15 U.S.C. § 703. 
 202. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 415. 
 203. 295 U.S. 495. 
 204. Id. at 521–53, 521 n.4. 
 205. Id. at 529. Within its separation of powers doctrine, the Supreme Court has been more 
hawkish about striking down attempts by one branch to aggrandize its power at the expense of another. 
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–24 (1976). 
 206. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002); see also 
Freeman, supra note 184, at 88 (arguing that despite the nondelegation doctrine, Congress has the 
power to delegate “broad powers that afford private actors considerable discretion”).  
 207. Garry, supra note 194, at 932–33. 
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administrative agency the power to fix commodities prices in response to 
wartime inflation. Emphasizing the need for legislative “flexibility,” the 
Court drew the constitutional line at “an absence of standards for the 
guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a 
proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been 
obeyed.”208 Because standards existed in the statute, no unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power occurred.  
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Congress’s broad authority to 
delegate so long as its enabling legislation includes an “intelligible 
principle” to guide the exercise of discretion,209 sustaining delegations 
with legislative directives that are as vague as acting “in the public 
interest.”210 The Court has justified its stance by parsing some delegations 
as more “executive” in nature than others. “[P]owers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative” cannot be delegated, whereas “those of less 
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to 
those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details” 
can be.
211
 Because the line between the two “has not been exactly 
 
 
 208. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
 209. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 379 (1989). The Court applied the intelligible principle test to uphold several legislative 
delegations before Schechter Poultry Corp. and Panama Refining Co. See Fed. Radio Comm’n v. 
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 284 (1933) (sustaining agency’s power to set rules 
regarding issuance of radio station licenses); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25–
27 (1932) (upholding the Interstate Commerce Commission’s statutory authority to regulate mergers 
and acquisitions of railroads). 
 210. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Nat’l Broad. Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp., 287 U.S. at 24–25) (“[W]e have 
found an ‘intelligible principle’ in various statutes authorizing regulation in the ‘public interest.’”); see 
also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413, 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What legislated standard, one must 
wonder, can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in 
various contexts, a ‘public interest’ standard?”). Justice Scalia nonetheless suggested in Mistretta v. 
United States that “the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation” of legislative and policymaking power 
is so “essential to democratic government” that “[o]ur members of Congress could not, even if they 
wished, vote all power to the President and adjourn sine die.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415. Nor, he 
added, could some lawmakers hand off their constitutional duties, such as voting on bills. See id. at 
417. “By a parity of reasoning,” Professor Verkuil has argued, “the President cannot turn the executive 
power over to the Vice President and retire in office.” Verkuil, supra note 195, at 425. He thus 
contends that the powers exercised by principal officers who were confirmed by the Senate and have 
taken oaths to uphold the Constitution are similarly nondelegable. Id. The President can delegate to 
subordinates under the Subdelegation Act, with limits (i.e., he can only delegate to officers of the 
United States). Id. at 426 (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–302 (2014)). By the same token, the statute limits the 
President’s ability to delegate to lesser officials or outside parties. See id. The Act notwithstanding, 
Professor Verkuil argues that “[t]he President could never claim an inherent power to delegate official 
duties to private hands.” Id. at 427–28. 
 211. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825); see also generally Alexander & 
Prakash, supra note 196, at 1041–42 (describing four different views of what Congress does when it 
delegates power, including the “Formalist Account [which] regards conventional delegations as 
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drawn,”212 the regulatory state operates under a substantial amount of 
legislative ambiguity,
213
 prompting Justice Thomas to query whether 
“delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ 
understanding of separation of powers.”214  
The intelligible principle test may be understood as a pragmatic 
reflection of the Court’s belief that necessity “fixes a point beyond which 
it is unreasonable and impractical to compel Congress to prescribe detailed 
rules.”215 In Mistretta v. United States, the Court blunted its rhetoric to 
suggest that “‘Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to 
another Branch.”216 By the Court’s account, this “general” separation of 
powers interdiction must give way to “a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more 
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to 
delegate power under broad general directives.”217 Thus, Congress is 
constitutionally free to “obtain[] the assistance of its coordinate Branches” 
in fulfilling its constitutional mandate,
218
 particularly “where flexibility 
and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable 
conditions constitute the essence of the program” in question.219  
The question of whether Congress can delegate legislative power 
directly to the private sector—bypassing the executive branch altogether—
 
 
delegations of rulemaking authority, without any actual delegation of legislative power,” and their 
adherents). 
 212. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 487 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a 
law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the 
law.”); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (“[W]hen Congress had legislated and 
indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions ‘power to fill up 
the details’ by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations . . . .”); Field v. Clark, 143 
U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (upholding delegation where the President was acting only as “the mere agent of 
the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which [Congress’s] expressed will 
was to take effect”); see also generally Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) 
(noting that the authority to enforce the laws and to appoint agents to do so are executive functions); 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (same). 
 213. Garry, supra note 194, at 940. 
 214. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mark 
Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the “New” Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2000) (“Once the reality that officials must be allowed to exercise such discretion is 
recognized, there is no principled way for the judiciary to draw a line between allowed and prohibited 
delegations of rulemaking authority.”). 
 215. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559–60 (1976) (quoting Am. 
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). 
 216. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing Field, 143 
U.S. at 692). 
 217. Id. at 372. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948). 
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was addressed most prominently in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
220
 In Carter, 
the Court struck down the Bituminous Conservation Coal Act, which 
authorized coal miners and producers to establish wages and maximum 
labor hours for mine workers.
221
 The statute required no governmental 
imprimatur before the provisions took effect. “This is legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form,” the Court wrote, “for it is not even 
delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, 
but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the 
interests of others in the same business.”222 Grasping for a public-private 
dividing line, the Court reasoned that “[t]he difference between producing 
coal and regulating its production is, of course, fundamental. The former is 
a private activity; the latter is necessarily a governmental function . . . .”223  
To be sure, delegations to the executive branch are not delegations to 
the President per se, but to an administrative bureaucracy. The 
administrative bureaucracy is larger, more nuanced, and more complex 
than Congress. Agency officials are not directly accountable at the voting 
booth and only tangentially through the President. As Alexander Hamilton 
wrote in Federalist No. 70, “a plurality in the executive . . . tends to 
conceal faults, and destroy responsibility.”224  
Private parties, by contrast, are not politically accountable, even 
through the President. Their terms and duties are of limited duration.
225
 
Unlike a federal officer, for whom “a superior can fix and then change the 
specific set of duties,” private actors “hav[e] those duties fixed by a 
contract.”226 And although private actors are made accountable to some 
degree by reputation, their respective constituencies are narrow and not 
disinterested.
227
  
Legal commentators have accordingly called private delegations more 
troubling “than the broadest delegations to public agencies.”228 Since the 
 
 
 220. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 221. Id. at 310–11.  
 222. Id. at 311. The Court further suggested that the delegation violated due process to the extent 
that it allowed private parties to regulate competitors. Id. This argument is problematic to the extent 
that it applies procedural due process protections to a legislative versus adjudicative decision. See Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (holding that “a general 
determination” affecting a large number of people in unexceptional ways is not bound by due process).  
 223. Carter, 298 U.S. at 311. 
 224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 225. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).  
 226. Constitutional Separation of Powers, supra note 111, at 141 (citing Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 393). 
 227. Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 335 n.97. 
 228. Freeman, supra note 15, at 583–84 (citing Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary 
Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 69 n.17 (1990); David M. Lawrence, The Private Exercise of Governmental 
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New Deal cases, however, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld 
delegations to agencies and private parties alike.
229
 In Currin v. Wallace, it 
found constitutional a statutory scheme that afforded private industry an 
“effective veto” over government regulations affecting tobacco markets.230 
And in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
231
 it upheld a statute 
allowing private coal producers to propose minimum coal prices to a 
government commission on the grounds that the industry merely 
“function[ed] subordinately to the Commission,” which retained the 
ultimate authority to implement legislative standards.
232
  
The Court had a recent opportunity to revisit the private delegation 
doctrine in Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American 
Railroads.
233
 On appeal was a decision of the D.C. Circuit finding 
unconstitutional a portion of the Passenger Rail Investment and 
Improvement Act of 2008 (“PRIIA”)234 that authorizes Amtrak—a 
congressionally-created government corporation—to jointly develop 
passenger rail performance measures with the Federal Railroad 
Administration. The statute provides further that if such measures are not 
timely promulgated, “any party involved in the development of those 
standards may petition the Surface Transportation Board to appoint an 
arbitrator to assist the parties in resolving their disputes through binding 
arbitration.”235 Deeming Amtrak “private” for delegation purposes, the 
D.C. Circuit applied the maxim that “[f]ederal lawmakers cannot delegate 
regulatory authority to a private entity” and struck down the PRIIA as 
unconstitutional.
236
 It reasoned that, unlike Amtrak, the private parties in 
 
 
Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 649–50 (1986)); cf. Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation 
Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
931, 979 (2014) (questioning whether a private delegation doctrine exists separate from the 
nondelegation doctrine). 
 229. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–74 (2001) (holding that the 
phrase, “requisite to protect the public health,” was sufficiently determinate to guide the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s establishment of national ambient air quality standards under the 
Clean Air Act); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 
U.S. 381 (1940). 
 230. 306 U.S. 1 (upholding statute that required two-thirds of regulated industry to approve 
regulations before they could take effect). 
 231. 310 U.S. 381.  
 232. Id. at 399. 
 233. 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). 
 234. Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848, 4907 (2008). 
 235. Id. at 4917. 
 236. Ass’n of Amer. R.R.s v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 
S. Ct. 1225.  
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Currin and Adkins did not “stand on equal footing with a government 
agency” under the respective statutes in question in those cases.237  
The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that Amtrak is a 
governmental entity and remanded the case for consideration, inter alia, of 
whether the statute violates the private delegation doctrine.
238
 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Kennedy emphasized the transparency and 
accountability mechanisms that necessarily bind Amtrak as a government 
actor, and linked those features to “‘[t]he structural principles secured by 
the separation of powers,’” which “‘protect the individual.’”239 In separate 
concurring opinions, both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas opined that the 
PRIIA violates the private delegation doctrine. For Justice Alito, the 
problem was the lack of political accountability for regulatory activity 
under the statutory scheme, as “[l]iberty requires accountability.”240 “If the 
arbitrator can be a private person,” he wrote, “this law is 
unconstitutional.”241 Justice Thomas ventured further, questioning the 
constitutionality of the entire federal regulatory apparatus on the theory 
that “the Constitution categorically forbids Congress to delegate its 
legislative power to any other body.”242 
Although the private delegation doctrine technically concerns itself 
with the scope of Congress’s authority to outsource legislative power, 
executive branch handoffs of its delegated authority to private parties are 
just as constitutionally intolerable under Justices Alito and Thomas’s 
reading of Article I. In Justice Alito’s words, “[w]hen it comes to private 
entities . . . there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification” for 
declining to enforce a black letter nondelegation doctrine.
243
 Taken 
together, the concurring opinions in Association of American Railroads 
suggest that if the case returns to the Supreme Court for resolution of the 
private delegation question, there will be support for its revival in ways 
that could apply to cabin privatization through the courts.  
For now, when private parties draft legislation, the primary rationale 
behind nondelegation—ensuring that “the will of Congress has been 
 
 
 237. Id. at 671 n.5.  
 238. Ass’n of Amer. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1233–34. 
 239. Id. at 1233 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)). 
 240. Id. at 1234 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 241. Id. at 1237. 
 242. Id. at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 243. Id. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring). “Because a private entity is neither Congress, nor the 
President or one of his agents, nor the Supreme Court or an inferior court established by Congress,” 
Justice Thomas added, “the Vesting Clauses would categorically preclude it from exercising the 
legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the Federal Government.” Id. at 1252 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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obeyed”—must be enforced elsewhere in constitutional doctrine.244 As 
explained below, the other doctrinal lens for confining agencies’ exercise 
of legislative power—Chevron and its progeny—is similarly indifferent to 
private sector policymaking on the people’s behalf. This constitutional 
infirmity renders painstakingly constructed separation of powers doctrine 
inapposite in the modern administrative state.  
B. Chevron and Its Progeny 
Even if Congress’s delegations are constitutional under prevailing law, 
the nondelegation and private delegation doctrines have nothing to say 
about subdelegations of policymaking authority by federal agencies to the 
private sector. Private sector lawmaking is excluded from constitutional 
scrutiny even though the power exercised derives from the same political 
sovereign—the people. The separation of powers implications of such 
delegations-within-delegations must be captured, if at all, by Chevron. Yet 
like nondelegation, Chevron doctrine fails to account for policymaking by 
the private sector at the behest of agencies to which Congress delegated 
rulemaking authority in the first instance.  
Before Chevron, courts operated under a “general principle of 
deference.”245 When agencies acted under broad grants of legislative 
authority to prescribe rules and regulations, courts were disinclined to 
defer to agency constructions of statutes.
246
 Deference was appropriate 
only when Congress specifically delegated power “to define a statutory 
term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision”247 and 
agencies “implement[ed] the congressional mandate in some reasonable 
manner.”248 Even then, this deference principle merely “set the framework 
for judicial analysis; it d[id] not displace it.”249 Courts “were allowed to 
substitute judgment on agency interpretations that could be characterized 
as ‘questions of law.’”250  
 
 
 244. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
 245. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew 
D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1257 (2007) 
(discussing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and noting that, “[p]rior to Chevron, the 
courts relied upon a host of factors to determine the appropriate level of deference owed to an agency’s 
interpretation in any given case”). 
 246. See, e.g., Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. at 24. 
 247. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); see also Garry, supra note 194, 
at 942. 
 248. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967). 
 249. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973). 
 250. William R. Andersen, Against Chevron—A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957, 958 
(2004). 
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Chevron altered this judicial prerogative by requiring that courts defer 
to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies are charged 
with administering.
251
 At issue in Chevron was the propriety of an EPA 
rule that defined the statutory term “stationary source” to mean the entirety 
of a power plant rather than individual structures within a plant that emit 
pollution.
252
 The Court set forth a two-step inquiry for judicial review of 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering: 
first, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue”; if so, the agency must apply the clear mandate of Congress.253 
Second, if a statute is ambiguous, the question becomes whether the 
interpretation of the statute adopted by the agency is “reasonable.” If so, 
the court must defer to that interpretation.
254
 This rule applies “even to 
pure questions of law, about which courts might appear to have a strong 
claim of superior expertise.”255 Chevron thus “move[d] an essential 
legislative function—the ability to make policy through the power to 
interpret statutes—squarely into the President’s domain.”256 An agency 
can pick amongst a range of competing meanings of statutory text and 
corresponding policy options, knowing that courts must uphold its choice. 
As a result, agencies can “reshape the political decisions made in the 
legislative process.”257 
Chevron’s mandate of judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of ambiguous statutory language follows from the Court’s doctrinal 
compromise on nondelegation.
258
 Agencies can legislate so long as there is 
an intelligible principle to guide their discretion. Chevron established a 
method for identifying the extent of that discretion under a given statute. 
In examining when to extend deference to decisions less formal than 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court in United States v. Mead 
Corp.
259
 and Barnhart v. Walton
260
 expanded agencies’ policymaking 
authority even further.  
Like nondelegation, Chevron is a prudential doctrine that responds to 
the practical limitations on Congress’s ability to monopolize 
 
 
 251. See Garry, supra note 194, at 922. 
 252. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
 253. Id. at 842. 
 254. Id. at 845. 
 255. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 744 (2004). 
 256. Garry, supra note 194, at 947 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 923 (“The evolution of the nondelegation doctrine essentially necessitates the Chevron 
doctrine.”). 
 259. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 260. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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policymaking. Its modest goal is to ensure fidelity to the text and spirit of 
an enabling statute, however vague, and “to ensure that the administrative 
agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic 
act.”261 In Chevron, the Court premised its deference requirement on three 
rationales: (1) agencies have specialized expertise that exceeds that of 
courts and even Congress; (2) agencies are more politically accountable 
than courts; and (3) agencies received the power to fill in the gaps of 
ambiguous statutes directly from Congress.
262
 None of these rationales 
support deference to an agency’s adoption of the private sector’s 
construction of legislation that the agency is charged with administering. 
The first rationale for Chevron deference embraces the view that 
agencies have more particularized expertise in the subject matter of 
statutes they are charged with administering than courts do. In Chevron, 
the Court observed that Congress might have “consciously desired the 
Administrator to strike the balance” by regulation, “thinking that those 
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the 
provision” at issue would be better able to reconcile competing policies 
than Congress itself.
263
 In his contemporaneous explanation of the New 
Deal, James Landis characterized agencies as responsive to society’s need 
for government regulation to an extent that exceeds the capabilities of 
Congress; unlike Congress or the courts, agencies are experts in their 
respective fields of lawmaking.
264
 Professor Funk has construed this 
analysis as implying that “agencies faced problems capable of objective 
solution, that politically neutral administrators could determine finite and 
correct answers to the problems of modern industrial society.”265  
To be sure, individuals in the private sector may have equivalent or 
even superior expertise in certain subjects as compared to government 
employees.
266
 But their incentive to make policy decisions in a manner 
that maximizes their own profit—even if such actions conflict with the 
legislative mandates of Congress—undermines the expertise rationale for 
 
 
 261. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1983). 
 262. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 865–66 
(1984). 
 263. Id. at 865. 
 264. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1–16, 23–24, 45–56 (1938).  
 265. Funk, supra note 125, at 90. 
 266. Regulators’ adoption of privately drafted standards is not uncommon in certain industries. 
See Shapiro, supra note 103, at 401–02 (discussing, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s adoption of protective health standards written by the American Conference of 
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists and the Security and Exchange Commission’s requirement 
that financial statements be prepared in accordance with accounting principles that were historically 
provided by private accounting associations). 
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deference to policy decisions made by private contractors.
267
 When private 
regulatory committees are dominated by industry, their work “results in 
lowest-common-denominator regulatory standards.”268 Scholars have 
observed, for example, that “the private sector often fails to accommodate 
health or safety considerations satisfactorily” when it is delegated 
responsibility for setting standards.
269
 Once private parties exercise 
regulatory power in self-interested ways, agencies may lack the political 
capital or superior expertise to second-guess them.
270
 Moreover, a private 
industry’s steady push for reductions in the scope of regulation belies a 
bias that is inconsistent with objective expertise.
271
 Thus, the Chevron 
Court’s expertise rationale for deference does not readily translate into 
deference for policymaking by private parties. 
The second rationale for Chevron deference—that agencies are 
politically accountable—is even less transferrable to the private sector. 
The Chevron Court reasoned that agency officials, through their link to the 
President, have greater accountability to the general public than does the 
judiciary.
272
 Thus, “an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities may . . . properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”273 Judges 
cannot. “While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices.”274  
 
 
 267. Id. at 404–05, 407, 426 (“[S]elf-regulation is more likely to reflect the political power of the 
self-regulated industry than the product of rational decisionmaking by an agency.”). Negotiated 
rulemaking lessens this problem because it includes a variety of parties with affected interests. See id. 
at 411–12. 
 268. Id. at 427. 
 269. Id. at 407–08 (quoting Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the 
Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 
1380–83 (1978), and citing THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE 
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 283 (1993)). 
 270. Id. at 405, 411. 
 271. See David A. Moss & Daniel Carpenter, Conclusion: A Focus on Evidence and Prevention, 
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 187, at 456 (“Today, . . . firms regularly aim to 
weaken regulation to reduce the costs of compliance . . . .”). 
 272. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) 
(“[F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made 
by those who do.”). 
 273. Id. at 865. 
 274. Id. Although it is technically true that agency officials are more accountable to the populace 
than federal judges because the unelected judiciary is appointed for life, the line of accountability from 
career agency employees to the President is quite attenuated. Moreover, numerous scholars have 
questioned whether agency employees are in fact more susceptible to industry capture than top-down 
political influence. Capture occurs when regulatory agencies are so heavily influenced by the very 
industries they are charged with regulating that they regulate in ways that benefit those industries 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/5
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Private parties, by contrast, are not beholden to the democratic process. 
Private contractors are unelected and unappointed, residing outside the 
bureaucratic umbrella of Article II. They are not bound by the same legal 
and constitutional constraints that apply to government employees. The 
public has no legal mechanism for rendering private contractors’ actions 
transparent or subjecting their decisions to judicial review. Private 
contractors are held accountable—if at all—via judicial enforcement of 
contract terms in actions brought exclusively by the government. The 
Chevron Court’s second rationale for agency deference thus does not 
support deference to the private sector’s resolution of policy ambiguities 
in federal legislation. 
The third rationale for Chevron deference turns on presumed 
congressional intent, which is the Court’s theory of choice for justifying 
deference to agencies post-Chevron.
275
 According to the Chevron Court, 
“[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.”276 If there is no such explicit 
conferral of authority to make rules with legislative force, the Court 
explained in United States v. Mead, courts should infer from an “agency’s 
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that 
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of 
law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the 
enacted law.”277 In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Services, the Court put it in delegation terms: “ambiguities in 
statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of 
authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion.”278 
Thus, Chevron allows Congress to pass a legislative matter onto an agency 
without clear definition of the limits of the agency’s discretion on the 
theory that Congress wants it that way.  
 
 
rather than in the public interest. See Moss & Carpenter, supra note 271, at 455–56 (suggesting that 
industry pressure to reduce regulation, or corrosive capture, is more common than industry efforts to 
regulate); see also Nancy Watzman, Rulemaking in the Dark: Little Disclosure When Big Food 
Lobbies the FDA, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2013, 7:14 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/ 
2013/09/26/Rulemaking_in_the_dark_FDA/ (stating that, in thirty-three meetings over a two-year 
period, industry group representatives were present at FDA meetings four times as often as consumer 
groups, culminating in food safety rules that the American Bakers Association called “a major victory” 
for its members). 
 275. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 863 (2001). 
 276. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 277. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 278. 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66). 
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Scholars have critiqued Chevron as a violation of the separation of 
powers, both because it unduly circumscribes courts’ role to “say what the 
law is”279 and because it empowers agencies to make law—otherwise a job 
for Congress.
280
 Chevron’s deference to agency constructions of vague 
language is also at odds with the nondelegation doctrine’s requirement of 
an intelligible principle, which ostensibly tolerates the transfer of power 
only “so long as it will be adequately controlled.”281 With Chevron, 
ambiguity in legislation enhances agency power to make policy. An 
intelligible principle must be sufficiently ambiguous to trigger Chevron 
deference—at least to the extent that such deference is justified by 
presumed congressional intent.
282
 This intersection between Chevron and 
the intelligible principle standard underscores that policymaking by any 
entity other than Congress has profound constitutional implications.  
Chevron’s reliance on legislative intent to justify deference to 
agencies’ policy judgments does not support deference to private parties’ 
performance of congressionally-delegated policymaking functions. 
Agencies—like Congress—are representatives of the public interest, a role 
that “does not permit [them] to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and 
strikes for adversaries appearing before [them].”283 The public is entitled 
to “receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the [agency]” 
as a byproduct of its delegated constitutional power.
284
 Private parties are 
not similarly constrained by public interest norms when they design public 
policy in the first instance. Their incentives are necessarily self-serving 
and possibly in conflict with the best interests of the broader populace. In 
outsourcing regulatory power to private entities, therefore, agencies 
compromise their ability to fulfill their role as representatives of the public 
interest.  
To be sure, an agency is positioned to adjust a regulation that is 
privately drafted to take into account the public interest before a rule 
 
 
 279. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-
Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 787 (1991) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803)). 
 280. See Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 742 (2007). 
 281. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative 
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989); see also Garry, supra note 194, at 951. 
 282. See Garry, supra note 194, at 952. 
 283. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965). 
But see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible 
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 414 (2000) (“The purpose of the regulatory process is not 
to implement a government-defined conception of the public good, but rather to supply benefits 
demanded by groups on behalf of their members’ private interests.”). 
 284. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference, 354 F.2d at 620. 
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becomes final. Because legislative rules are subject to the APA’s notice 
and comment or formal rulemaking procedures before they can have the 
force of law, the rulemaking process necessarily operates to counteract 
private sector bias with the imprimatur of good government. Michael Herz 
has suggested, however, that “[t]his argument is quite flawed, a classic, 
mistaken greater-includes-the-lesser argument.”285 Such “claims of 
rational justifications for rules are often smokescreens for interest group 
horse-trading, with the agency playing mediator, orchestrator, or 
auctioneer.”286 Paul Verkuil points out, moreover, that overworked agency 
officials increasingly delegate the task of summarizing comments to 
private parties and simply “sign[] off on the results.”287 This temptation to 
rubber stamp the work of private contractors means that countervailing 
public interest norms may not meaningfully influence the rulemaking 
process when private parties do the initial drafting. Thus, “[t]he 
responsibility for knowing the record before decisions are made cannot be 
delegated if the agency wants to retain true decision power and discharge 
its public responsibilities.”288 
Moreover, agencies are prone to adhere to the policy judgments made 
in draft rules that are put open for public comment. This so-called 
“anchoring effect” on agencies means that “[d]efects in the antecedent 
process cannot be so easily dismissed.”289 When private parties are 
responsible for policy judgments in the first instance, agencies are apt to 
make “after-the-fact rationale[s] attempting to justify decisions made” at 
the early stages of a rulemaking—“for reasons we can never know.”290 
Empirical studies support this conclusion. Unless there is public consensus 
that a proposed rule should be changed, agencies tend to side with the 
comments that support the initial draft.
291
 As a consequence, interested 
parties must “get[] heard prior to an agency setting its proposal in stone, as 
is likely the case with the publication of a formal notice of proposed rule 
 
 
 285. Herz, supra note 164, at 376 (discussing phenomenon in the context of negotiated 
rulemaking). 
 286. Peter H. Schuck & Steven Kochevar, Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform, 
15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 417, 431 (2014). 
 287. Verkuil, supra note 31, at 928. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Herz, supra note 164, at 376; see also James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral 
Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779, 788 
(2012) (discussing anchoring or “confirmation bias” in the context of antitrust policymaking). 
 290. Funk, supra note 125, at 79 (discussing phenomenon in the context of negotiated 
rulemaking). 
 291. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 353, 356 (citing Marissa Golden, Interest Groups in the 
Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 245 (1998)). 
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making.”292 And “[o]nce this occurs, . . . inertia makes it more difficult for 
an interest group to influence the agency to make major changes.”293  
Thus, like the nondelegation doctrine, Chevron deference does not 
account for private sector influence on policymaking, which as a 
consequence operates beyond the scope of judicial review.
294
 The next Part 
offers an alternative approach to Chevron and nondelegation that 
recognizes the constitutional significance of the private sector’s furtive 
influence on the rulemaking process. In short, when rules are organized 
and drafted in the first instance by entities other than the agency delegatee 
identified in the enabling legislation, judicial review must be more—not 
less—searching. 
III. THE CASE FOR ENHANCED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY 
SUBDELEGATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
This Part urges a more rigorous application of the private delegation 
doctrine and Chevron to rulemakings that are conducted by private parties 
without the express consent of Congress. To the extent that agency 
subdelegations of policymaking power are not grounded in statutory text, 
they would seem perforce to violate both the nondelegation and Chevron 
doctrines. Thus, in “its role as protector of the constitutional design,”295 
the Supreme Court should develop a private subdelegation doctrine that 
requires congressional authorization for agency handoffs of legislative 
authority to the private sector.  
Additionally, or in the alternative, the Court should decline to apply 
Chevron deference to rulemakings that are heavily influenced by 
unrepresentative segments of the private sector. Courts are better suited 
than extraconstitutional, private actors to render definitive interpretations 
of vague legislation. Such adaptations of the nondelegation and Chevron 
 
 
 292. Id. at 363; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 259 (2001) (noting that high level ratification of proposed rules is often 
automatic, for many reasons, making it difficult to reverse course). But see Schuck & Kochevar, supra 
note 286, at 430 (“If a negotiated rule really did flout the public interest or meaningfully depart from 
norms of reasoned decision-making, we should expect notice and comment procedures and judicial 
review to detect and reject it.”). 
 293. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 363. 
 294. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and 
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 225 (2012) (stating that “[w]hen we see an agency 
. . . adopting regulatory policies favored by regulated entities,” the situation “open[s] the door for the 
agency or regulated entities to defend the agency’s policy choices as the best the agency could do 
under its mandate to protect the public”). 
 295. Barbara Hinkson Craig & Robert S. Gilmour, The Constitution and Accountability for Public 
Functions, 5 GOVERNANCE 46, 50 (1992). 
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doctrines would foster normative principles of good government—
including public accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and rational 
decisionmaking—when public power is exercised on the private end of the 
constitutional policymaking continuum. 
A. A Private Subdelegation Doctrine 
The nondelegation and private delegation doctrines grapple with a 
tension between workability and accountability; that is, how to develop 
legal doctrine that reflects the layered nature of modern government while 
ensuring fidelity to the separation of powers. This tension defines the 
battleground for constitutional analysis of unorthodox quasi-governmental 
structures today, including policymaking by private parties. The leading 
doctrines for addressing the constitutionality of private lawmaking—the 
nondelegation and Chevron doctrines—resolve that tension by reference to 
express or presumed congressional intent. A private subdelegation 
doctrine should likewise confine policymaking to the political branches of 
government unless Congress expressly authorizes private sector 
rulemaking. 
Development of a subdelegation doctrine is sensible for several 
reasons. First, the Constitution’s separation of powers embodies a 
recognition that, “without th[e] check of judicial review, agencies could 
essentially become judges of their own cases, which the framers clearly 
opposed.”296 To be constitutionally permissible, therefore, delegation 
requires judicial review.
297
 Yet judicial review requires legislative 
standards. Even under the lax intelligible principle test, the Court has 
adhered to the notion that a total “absence of standards for the guidance of 
[an agency’s] action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding 
to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,” is 
unconstitutional.
298
 If Congress authorizes an agency to make policy under 
 
 
 296. Garry, supra note 194, at 946 n.163. “If the [rulemaking] process is nothing but a massive 
delegation of government authority to the private sector, then judicial policing of the outcomes is 
vital.” Herz, supra note 164, at 367.  
 297. Herz, supra note 164, at 367 (“The strenuousness of review should be tied to the risk of 
illegality, which is especially high . . . when there is the momentum of stakeholder consensus 
supporting a particular outcome.”). 
 298. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (stating that Congress cannot “provide[] literally no guidance for the 
exercise of discretion”); cf. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the Court has 
“almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law”). 
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a particular statute, the agency’s power is limited to what Congress allows 
it to do. If Congress does not authorize agencies to subdelegate 
governmental authority to the private sector, or if it fails to provide 
statutory boundaries to govern the private exercise of that authority, courts 
cannot meaningfully exercise judicial review. Without legislative 
authorization, agencies’ decisions to outsource their policymaking powers 
are constitutionally infirm.  
Second, a subdelegation doctrine would enforce the existing 
presumption that, for the nondelegation doctrine to work, Congress must 
delegate to particularized recipients. Just as the nondelegation doctrine is 
confined to delegations by Congress, the intelligible principle standard 
only applies to delegations to particular executive branch agencies. The 
doctrine assumes that congressionally-delegated authority is exclusive to 
the agency specifically identified in a statute. This is why, say, the Federal 
Trade Commission cannot promulgate environmental or labor laws with 
the force of law—those tasks are delegated to the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Department of Labor, respectively. In Mistretta 
v. United States, the Court explained that a delegation is “constitutionally 
sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 
authority.”299 The Third Circuit has likewise construed the intelligible 
principle test as requiring “that Congress identify the recipient of the 
delegated authority.”300 Given that private parties are less democratically 
accountable than federal agencies—and thus more structurally attenuated 
from Congress itself—it makes little sense to preclude the Federal Trade 
Commission from issuing securities regulations while allowing the 
regulated industry to issue such regulations at the behest of the Securities 
Exchange Commission. Moving from accountable government agents to 
unaccountable private ones deflects from democratic decisionmaking, 
which is at the heart of the constitutional requirement that Congress 
delegate intelligible principles. 
Third, a subdelegation doctrine would ensure that Congress’s 
constitutionally protected power remains in the hands of the legislative 
branch. In the words of Justice Kagan and Judge Barron, “[a]ll the 
constitutional structure suggests is that Congress has control over the 
allocation of authority to resolve statutory ambiguity.”301 This idea finds 
support in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, in which Justice Scalia 
 
 
 299. 488 U.S. at 372–73 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 300. United States v. Cooper, 750 F.3d 263, 272 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 301. Barron & Kagan, supra note 292, at 222. 
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wrote a majority opinion upholding the CAA’s delegation of power to the 
EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards that “are 
requisite to protect the public health.”302 Because the text of Article I 
“permits no delegation of [legislative] powers,” he explained, “Congress 
must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’”303 He rejected 
the suggestion that “an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of 
the statute.”304 An agency cannot “declin[e] to exercise some of that 
power” it was delegated.305 That choice—“that is to say, the prescription 
of the standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of 
the forbidden legislative authority.”306 Justices Thomas and Stevens each 
wrote separately to take issue with whether legislative power per se is 
delegable, but effectively agreed that Congress holds the reigns when it 
comes to delegating policymaking authority—and must retain that hold in 
its enabling legislation.
307
 
If agencies cannot decline to exercise delegated power, it follows that 
they cannot unilaterally decide to give that power to a private third party, 
either. To be sure, in his concurring opinion in Whitman, Justice Stevens 
read the Vesting Clauses as devoid of express delegation limits.
308
 Yet his 
analysis is consistent with the majority’s view that it is Congress’s 
prerogative to dictate the terms whereby—and by whom—a statute is 
implemented.
309
 The legislative power is vested in the Congress, a political 
branch of government. Thus, only Congress can decide whether extra-
constitutional actors may exercise that power.  
 
 
 302. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)). 
 303. Id. at 472 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 473. 
 306. Id.  
 307. Justice Thomas complained that the Constitution itself contains no reference to “intelligible 
principles,” and warned of a “delegated decision [that] is simply too great for the decision to be called 
anything other than ‘legislative.’” Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). For his part, Justice Stevens 
urged “frank[] acknowledg[ement] that the power delegated to the EPA is ‘legislative,’” but reasoned 
that it is nevertheless “constitutional because [it is] adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing 
statute.” Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring). Refusing to “pretend, as the Court does, that the authority 
delegated . . . is somehow not ‘legislative power,’” he argued that nothing in the Vesting Clauses 
“purport[s] to limit the authority of either recipient of power to delegate authority to others.” Id. at 
488–89. “Surely,” he reasoned, “the authority granted to members of the Cabinet and federal law 
enforcement agents is properly characterized as ‘Executive’ even though not exercised by the 
President.” Id. at 489. 
 308. Id. at 489 (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 752 (1986)). 
 309.  See id. at 472 (“Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies . . . .”). 
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Fourth, agency subdelegations of legislative power to private parties 
raise conflict-of-interest concerns of constitutional weight, which do not 
exist when Congress or federal agencies make policy on their own. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the coercive power of private 
interests is antithetical to the legislative function under the Constitution. In 
Schechter Poultry, the government argued that the NIRA provisions in 
question were constitutional because the privately-drafted codes the statute 
authorized would “consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each 
industry by representative members of that industry—by the persons most 
vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems.”310 The Court 
rejected this argument on the rationale that it is not Congress’s role to 
support the objectives of private industry, which is inherently biased:  
“would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its 
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to 
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for 
the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?”311 The Court 
deemed it “obvious” that “[s]uch a delegation . . . [would be] utterly 
inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of 
Congress.”312 
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
313
 the Court cast its concern over self-
interested private regulators in due process terms. It drew a “fundamental” 
distinction “between producing coal and regulating its production” under 
the statute at issue in Carter, with “[t]he former . . . a private activity” and 
“the latter . . . necessarily a governmental function, since, in the very 
nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to 
regulate the business of another, and especially of a competitor.”314 Hence, 
the Court reasoned, “a statute which attempts to confer such power 
undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal 
liberty and private property,” rendering “[t]he delegation . . . a denial of 
rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”315 
 
 
 310. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 314. Id. at 311. 
 315. Id.; see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A 
potential conflict arises . . . whenever government delegates licensing power to private parties whose 
economic interests may be served by limiting the number of competitors who may engage in a 
particular trade.”); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICAAN to Route Around 
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 153 (2000) (stating that the private delegation doctrine 
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The Carter Court’s nod to due process has yet to rematerialize in 
private delegation doctrine.
316
 Yet the notion that private parties’ 
inevitable drive to regulate for their own benefit and at the expense of 
competitors and/or the public applies with even greater force to agency 
subdelegations of regulatory authority to the private sector. The logic of 
Carter accordingly suggests that, at a minimum, agency decisions to 
outsource regulatory power to private industry should be grounded in 
express legislative authorization. 
Thus, by enabling judicial review of agency decisions to subdelegate 
legislative power to private parties, a subdelegation doctrine would serve 
the separation of powers in a manner that is entirely consistent with the 
longstanding, congressionally-focused approach to nondelegation. 
Likewise, as described below, Chevron should be applied to require that 
agencies exercise their rulemaking powers in a manner that adheres to 
legislative intent—including when they outsource delegated functions to 
the private sector. 
B. Chevron Step Zero 
Absent a private subdelegation doctrine, Chevron represents the sole 
mechanism for judicial oversight of what Judge Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit has called the “abdication of regulatory authority to the regulated, 
the full burgeoning of the interest-group state, and the final confirmation 
of the ‘capture’ theory of administrative regulation.”317 Under the APA, 
regulators can freely communicate with the regulated community and 
other interest groups in the rulemaking process, enabling affected parties 
to invest in the final product at its nascent stages.
318
 This Article does not 
advocate for additional procedural encumbrances on the rulemaking 
 
 
“is, in fact, rooted in a prohibition against self-interested regulation”); Lawrence, supra note 228, at 
659. 
 316. It is one of the issues the Court identified for consideration by the D.C. Circuit on remand in 
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015). 
The D.C. Circuit ruled on this matter on April 29, 2016, reversing the ruling of the lower court, finding 
that the PRIIA violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by “authorizing an economically 
self-interested actor to regulate its competitors,” and the Appointments Clause by “delegating 
regulatory power to an improperly appointed arbitrator.” Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 
12-5204, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 2016). The court declined to reach the question of whether “a 
government corporation whose board is only partially comprised of members appointed by the 
President [is] constitutionally eligible to exercise regulatory power.” Id. 
 317. USA Grp. Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 318. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(recognizing “Congress’ intent not to prohibit or require disclosure of all ex parte contacts during or 
after the public comment stage” of informal rulemakings under the APA). 
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process, which can frustrate legislative objectives and foster inefficiencies. 
It asserts, rather, that courts should reclaim their role of “say[ing] what the 
law is”319 to account for the private sector’s increasing influence in the 
rulemaking process.  
To restate the basics, Chevron’s two-part test holds that if statutory 
language is clear under step one, Congress did not delegate policymaking 
authority in the first instance. This step ensures fidelity to statutory 
parameters, the structural Constitution, and the judicial prerogative of 
upholding the rule of law. Delegation occurs only when statutory 
ambiguity exists.
320
 If agencies issue rules with the force of law pursuant 
to such ambiguity, their policymaking receives deference under step two.  
No deference occurs, however, if an agency is not acting in a way that 
operates as a substitute for the legislative process.
321
 The Court has stated 
that “[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates 
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a 
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness 
and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”322 
For administrative actions that are less formal than notice and comment or 
formal rulemakings, judges must search for congressional authorization 
for agencies to make policy with the force of law.
323
 Specifically, courts 
conduct a “step zero” analysis to determine if Congress intended the 
agency to receive policymaking deference by virtue of processes that are 
not grounded in express statutory authorization.  
Because deference runs—if at all—only to agencies to which Congress 
delegates rulemaking authority, the Court should construe Chevron step 
zero to decline deference to rules that reflect policy crafted by the private 
sector.
324
 In this way, step zero would function to replace the 
nondelegation doctrine’s role in preserving structural safeguards under the 
Constitution when public power is exercised along the right side of the 
constitutional policymaking continuum. Alternatively, courts should apply 
 
 
 319. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
 320. Cass Sunstein has thus called Chevron a prodelegation canon. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329–30 (2000). 
 321. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218, 229 (2001). 
 322. Id. at 230. 
 323. See Garry, supra note 194, at 956. 
 324. If this element were incorporated into the Chevron analysis, agencies would be incentivized 
to include in the administrative record facts demonstrating how the policy reflected in the final rule 
was crafted. Cf. Damien M. Schiff, Sackett v. EPA: Compliance Orders and the Right of Judicial 
Review, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113, 136 (“When the agency knew that it could not be hailed into 
court for its compliance orders, it had no incentive to shore up its administrative record; now that such 
a result is possible, the EPA has a real incentive to do its homework before acting.”). 
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Chevron step one to construe legislative silence as precluding agency 
authority to delegate policymaking to the public sector in response to the 
“broader criticism of the growth and power of the modern administrative 
state—e.g., that Congress has lost control through the nondelegation 
doctrine, and that courts have lost control through Chevron.”325  
In reverting to a search for congressional intent, step zero replaces 
nondelegation’s role in preserving the Constitution’s structural safeguards, 
including its retention of policymaking power in the most democratic 
branch of government: the legislature. If there is a clear legislative 
mandate as to how a particular statute should be implemented, Chevron 
requires judicial review of the resulting regulation in order to ensure 
agency adherence to congressional intent. If there is no such legislative 
mandate or an agency uses a less formal process to make policy, step zero 
holds agencies accountable within the boundaries of their delegated 
authority by enabling courts to ultimately clarify what the law is when 
agencies do not exercise authority to make policy with the force of law.
326
  
When rulemaking is conducted largely by the private sector, “the need 
for careful judicial scrutiny is particularly appropriate due to . . . the 
potential for collusion among those who are present to distort statutory 
terms.”327 In the typical notice and comment process, “[b]usiness oriented 
groups overwhelm an ‘overstretched’ agency staff with ‘[a] continuous 
barrage of letters, telephone calls, meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal 
comments, post-rule comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices 
of appeal.’”328 The agency takes these inputs into consideration in 
formulating policy in drafts of legislative rules or nonlegislative guidance. 
“[I]f most of the information submitted to an agency reflects an industry 
view of regulatory issues,” however, “regulators are likely to be over-
influenced by this experience, leading them to form generalizations that 
undermine their capacity to visualize other policy alternatives.”329 
Psychological studies suggest that “people are subject to an availability 
heuristic, which causes them to overestimate the probability of events 
 
 
 325. Garry, supra note 194, at 946 n.163. 
 326. This is so even if Skidmore deference—which affords courts discretion as to whether to take 
into account an agency’s policymaking choices—applies. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
139–40 (1944). 
 327. Choo, supra note 64, at 1071. 
 328. Shapiro, supra note 294, at 238 (quoting Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter 
Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010)). 
 329. Id.  
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based on the information most immediately available to them.”330 Thus, 
agency personnel are prone to adhere to the policy alternatives that they 
accept at the outset of a rulemaking. Judicial review serves to counteract 
such actual or perceived bias that may be embodied in a final rule at the 
expense of broader public interests reflected in the plain language of the 
statute.  
Absent robust judicial review, moreover, agencies can “effectively turn 
their backs on their statutory mandates” by outsourcing their rulemaking 
functions.
331
 In negotiated rulemaking—a close cousin of the type of 
private sector policymaking embodied in the CPP
332—“agencies try at 
times to cajole warring outside interest groups into signing off on 
compromises that are not legally, much less technically, appropriate.”333 
As a consequence, “[i]ssues of statutory construction [a]re resolved more 
through a process of political bargaining than disinterested legal reasoning 
or expertise[,] . . . contrary to Chevron’s intent.”334 Agencies function as 
“mere participants” in the rulemaking process, and no longer manifest the 
expertise rationale for Chevron deference.
335
 Negotiated rules can thus “no 
longer be presumed to reflect either the agency’s own expertise or choice 
of the ‘best’ policy, based on instrumentally rational decisionmaking.”336 
Courts have declined to apply Chevron deference when the record fails to 
reflect how an agency employed its own expertise in making a policy 
decision.
337
 
 
 
 330. Id. (citing SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121 
(1993)). 
 331. Rena Steinzor & Scott Strauss, Building a Consensus: Agencies Stressing ‘Reg Neg’ 
Approach, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at 21. 
 332. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 authorizes agencies to bring interested parties 
together to draft a proposed rule. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (1994)). Congress has also specifically directed certain agencies to engage in 
negotiated rulemaking. See Choo, supra note 64, at 1074 n.30 (compiling statutes). 
 333. Steinzor & Strauss, supra note 331, at 21.  
 334. Choo, supra note 64, at 1097. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (observing 
that “[w]e will defer to the Commission’s judgment in technical matters within its expertise, but only 
when the Commission has in fact exercised its judgment,” and finding that agency did not warrant 
deference with respect to economic analysis); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 
1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (refusing to defer to agency finding regarding short-term chemical 
exposure in the work place); see also Choo, supra note 64, at 1102 (arguing that resulting regulations 
“carry particularly questionable democratic legitimacy, and courts should not exacerbate this problem 
by extending Chevron deference to them”); cf. Cent. Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 
F.3d 1531, 1540 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing that “the ‘expertise model’ does not necessarily 
mandate judicial deference”). 
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Private sector rulemaking undermines the democratic rationale for 
Chevron deference to the extent that it produces rules that fail to serve the 
public interest. If rules drafters are not neutral, expert, or detached in the 
same way as public officials are presumed to be, “law becomes nothing 
more than the expression of private interests mediated through some 
governmental body.”338 Agency rulemaking loses its public interest 
objective,
339
 subtly transforming public law into a set of “private law 
relationships.”340 “[C]ourts can no longer presume that regulations 
formulated through private interest group bargaining embody either the 
agency’s conception of the public interest, or an application of legal, 
technical, or policy expertise that is worthy of judicial deference.”341 
Outsourced rulemaking is even more problematic than negotiated 
rulemaking because only a subset of interests is represented in the drafting 
process.  
With government policymaking becoming more privatized, doctrine 
must develop to counteract courts’ tendency to apply Chevron “without 
regard to a rule’s negotiated origins.”342 Just as step zero requires courts to 
determine the level of deference to afford policymaking that is not 
grounded in express statutory authorization, step zero should operate to 
sort out whether policymaking that results from agencies’ unilateral 
subdelegations to the private sector should receive judicial deference. 
Because private sector policymaking does not itself bear the characteristics 
of government action that Congress intended to have the force of law, it 
should not receive deference under Chevron step zero. 
The scant Supreme Court cases amounting to the step zero canon shore 
up the conclusion that agency policymaking should not receive Chevron 
deference to the extent that it derives from substantial private sector 
influence. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court refused to apply 
Chevron deference to letter rulings made by forty-six offices of the US 
Customs Service because they did not “bespeak the legislative type of 
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling.”343 
The tariff classifications applied only to the particular importers to whom 
they were issued.
344
 The Court justified its decision not to apply Chevron 
 
 
 338. William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1375 (1997). 
 339. Choo, supra note 64, at 1100. 
 340. Funk, supra note 338, at 1386. 
 341. Choo, supra note 64, at 1071. 
 342. Id. at 1081. 
 343. 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001). 
 344. Id. at 233. 
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by broadly referencing “the great variety of ways in which the laws invest 
the Government’s administrative arms with discretion, and with 
procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress.”345  
The private sector’s influence on bureaucratic policymaking likewise 
demands review of notice and comment rulemakings that is grounded in 
congressional intent. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
346
 
the Court denied the FDA Chevron deference despite a seemingly broad 
grant of rulemaking authority. Finding that Congress did not delegate to 
the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco as a drug, the Court invalidated 
a regulation painstakingly promulgated by notice and comment. “[N]o 
matter how important, conspicuous, and controversial the issue, and 
regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch 
politically accountable,” the Court reasoned, “an administrative agency’s 
power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid 
grant of authority from Congress.”347 The “common sense” that guided the 
Court in Brown & Williamson “as to the manner in which Congress is 
likely to delegate a policy decision of . . . economic and political 
magnitude to an administrative agency”348 virtually forecloses the 
possibility that Congress ever means to impliedly delegate lawmaking 
power to private parties.  
In Barnhart v. Walton,
349
 the Court applied additional factors in the 
step zero analysis in affording Chevron deference to the Social Security 
Administration’s denial of disability benefits. The Court looked to “the 
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to 
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the 
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period 
of time” to conclude that the agency’s interpretation of the underlying 
statute fell within its “lawful” interpretative authority.350 The Barnhart 
factors thus justify deference only where the rationales underlying 
Chevron itself exist (i.e., studious consideration of longstanding policy 
questions within a particular agency’s expertise).  
These factors hardly apply to agency rulemakings that are conducted 
by the private sector. If the propriety of deference is framed as a question 
of congressional intent under Chevron, deference can only run to an 
 
 
 345. Id. at 236. 
 346. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 347. Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 348. Id. at 133. 
 349. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 350. Id. at 217, 222. 
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executive branch agency. Congress cannot be presumed to defer to private 
sector expertise when a statute delegates rulemaking power to government 
actors. Nor can courts reasonably conclude under Barnhart that Congress 
intended for longstanding agency rulemaking practices to be supplanted by 
the successful lobbying efforts of particular non-governmental actors. Just 
as the Customs decisions in Mead were not without consideration of all 
affected interests in mind, policymaking derived from private influence is 
a poor proxy for the generalized, representative decision-making that the 
most democratic branch of government—Congress—is designed to 
produce. Private parties function without transparency and out of self-
interest rather than in service of the broader public good. As such, 
rulemaking driven by special interests should not have the same binding 
effect as policymaking that germinates within the constitutional structure 
of government.  
Under step zero, therefore, Chevron deference should be conditioned 
on a finding that agency officials—and not the private sector—made the 
policy reflected in a regulation. For rules drafted in the first instance by 
private actors, courts should employ de novo review for consistency with 
legislative objectives. The Court has already carved out exceptions to 
Chevron deference (e.g., agency lawyers do not get deference for 
arguments made in the course of litigation);
351
 private sector rulemaking 
could simply be added to this list.
352
  
Moreover, in order to trigger a Chevron deference analysis under step 
zero, agencies would by necessity include in the administrative record 
information regarding the drafting process—much like they construct the 
administrative record with an eye towards arbitrary and capricious 
review.
353
 Courts would then determine if a rule embodies a policy deal 
struck between an agency and certain interest groups to the exclusion of 
others.
354
 If the record fails to demonstrate that a rulemaking was driven 
 
 
 351. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 238 n.19 (2001); Bowen v. Georgetown 
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1988). 
 352. Cf. Choo, supra note 64, at 1085, 1087 (making the same point regarding negotiated 
rulemaking, and noting that the architect of negotiated rulemaking had argued that there should be 
little to no judicial review of the results). 
 353. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). Although the 
Supreme Court held in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978), that courts cannot add procedural requirements to the APA, the D.C. Circuit has held 
that Vermont Yankee is not inconsistent with Overton Park’s requirement that, “in order to allow for 
meaningful judicial review, the agency must produce an administrative record that delineates the path 
by which it reached its decision.” Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.3d 325, 338–39 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). The same analysis would apply here. 
 354. See Seidenfeld, supra note 283, at 457 n.199. 
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by internal agency expertise rather than private sector influence, the result 
would simply be less deference to the policy contained in the final rule. 
Agencies could decide for themselves whether to limit ex parte influence 
in the rulemaking process or establish a more inclusive, collaborative 
process in order to avoid more stringent judicial review. By bolstering 
judicial review for such considerations, step zero would tie rulemakings 
back to Congress’s intent in delegating power to an agency in the first 
instance. This is, at bottom, a decision about “which political branch will 
have the authority to control the outcome of an issue.”355 
Courts could alternatively confine subdelegations of policymaking to 
the private sector under step one of the Chevron analysis by finding what 
Lisa Shultz Bressman calls “clarity in ambiguity.”356 Chevron’s 
congressional intent rationale assumes that Congress understands that, in 
transferring policymaking power to the executive branch, it protects its 
own interests by virtue of the fiscal, statutory, and constitutional oversight 
mechanisms that apply to federal agencies. Such checks do not apply to 
the private sector. Thus, even if it is appropriate to infer congressional 
intent to defer to agency policymaking from vague statutory language, 
ambiguity does not necessarily translate into deference to policymaking 
conducted by private parties that an agency unilaterally imports into the 
rulemaking process. In fact, the opposite inference—no deference—should 
apply if Congress is silent regarding the propriety of private sector 
influence. In other words, “[b]y denying agencies the discretion to 
interpret ambiguous terms as they see fit, the Court effectively may block 
the delegation of policymaking authority.”357 In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa 
Utilities Board, the Supreme Court struck down an agency interpretation 
under Chevron step two on the rationale that it lacked “some limiting 
standard, rationally related to the goals of the [statute].”358 Likewise, 
absent an indication of congressional intent that agencies may defer to 
factions of the private sector in rulemakings, it would be up to the 
judiciary to fill gaps in legislative policy.  
To be sure, it is difficult—if not impossible—to accurately discern the 
extent to which private sector influence impacts routine notice and 
comment rulemakings; the empirical evidence regarding the very existence 
 
 
 355. Ku, supra note 160, at 140; see also Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 338. 
 356. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1411 (2000). 
 357. Id. at 1412. 
 358. 525 U.S. 366, 388–89 (1999). 
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of regulatory capture is mixed.
359
 Scholars have nonetheless urged more 
public transparency regarding the extent of industry influence in 
rulemakings to test their fidelity to legislative directives.
360
 Mead’s 
“unstructured, case-by-case inquiry into whether deference to an agency 
interpretation ‘makes best sense’” provides a platform for such judicial 
review.
361
  
C. Baseline Values Revisited 
The Court has stood by the foundational premise that the Constitution’s 
structure forbids the respective branches from delegating a certain subset 
of their federal powers to any other entity. A formalist reading of the 
Vesting Clauses thus leaves scant leeway for the exercise of legislative 
power outside the boundaries of the Constitution.
362
 As a practical matter, 
the Court has instead taken a functional approach to separation of powers 
doctrine, including nondelegation and Chevron. Similarly, a functional 
approach to constitutional structure supports a framework for analysis of 
subdelegations of legislative authority to the private sector even though, 
from a formalist perspective, the private sector is beyond the 
Constitution’s reach.  
Specifically, a private subdelegation doctrine and expanded application 
of Chevron step zero would bring private lawmaking within the ambit of 
legal and political oversight that applies to government actors, enabling 
courts to reclaim their role of policing delegations of vested constitutional 
power.
363
 As explained below, such doctrinal shifts would relieve the 
strain on core values underlying the Constitution’s design that privatized 
lawmaking creates.
364
  
1. Accountability 
This Article has argued that courts should construe Chevron step zero 
as denying deference to rules that embody private sector constructions of 
ambiguous statutory language. By tethering deference to a particular 
agency specified in an enabling statute, such an approach would promote 
 
 
 359. Barron & Kagan, supra note 292, at 239–40. 
 360. See id. at 253. 
 361. Id. at 225. 
 362. Krent, supra note 228, at 68. 
 363. Ku, supra note 160, at 77. 
 364. This Article makes no claims as to the normative value of outsourcing policymaking to the 
private sector. 
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“accountable and disciplined decision making, in much the way the 
congressional nondelegation doctrine is meant to do in another context.”365  
The Constitution sets forth a procedural framework for the definition 
and allocation of the people’s power to self-govern. People accept the 
Constitution because it establishes a “specifically constituted, 
democratically deliberative lawmaking system to which all primary legal 
content is constantly accountable.”366 It assumes that voters can identify 
which branch and which government actor is responsible for a particular 
action. When rulemaking functions are outsourced by contract or via 
informal lobbying efforts, government actors abdicate their constitutional 
responsibilities, leaving the public without democratically accountable 
actors in core policymaking roles.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected politicians’ attempts to 
shirk responsibility for policymaking by handing it off to other entities and 
muddying lines of accountability.
367
 In Printz v. United States,
368
 Justice 
Scalia wrote for the Court that “[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates that a 
State’s government will represent and remain accountable to its own 
citizens.”369 Because the Brady hand gun statute allowed Congress to 
evade public accountability for its effects, Congress could take credit for 
“‘solving’ problems” related to handguns without raising federal taxes, 
while at the same time putting states “in the position of taking the blame 
for its burdensomeness and for its defects.”370 As the Court elsewhere 
explained, “where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the 
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”371 So, too, 
where agencies subdelegate policymaking power to private actors, lines of 
political accountability are blurred. The unavailability of judicial review 
exacerbates this problem.  
A private subdelegation doctrine would enhance government 
accountability by empowering courts to confine outsourcing of legislative-
type functions and require that policymaking retain its democratic 
 
 
 365. Barron & Kagan, supra note 292, at 238, 241. Justice Kagan and Judge Barron have 
accordingly argued that Chevron should apply only if “statutory delegetes” make policy decisions. Id. 
at 236, 237 (defining statutory delegate as “the officer to whom the agency’s organic statute has 
granted authority over a given administrative action,” often the secretary of the department). 
 366. Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2000). 
 367. See Brown, supra note 110, at 1379–80 (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), among others). 
 368. 521 U.S. 898. 
 369. Id. at 920 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168–69; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576–
77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 370. Id. at 930. 
 371. New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
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moorings. Likewise, by deferring to courts’ reading of legislative 
ambiguity over that of unrepresentative segments of the private sector, a 
revised approach to Chevron step zero would enhance democratic 
accountability. Agencies would be forced to make public the process by 
which rules are drafted—and by whom—enabling candid debate over the 
propriety of agencies’ decisions to adopt private sector policy objectives. 
Unilateral decisions to employ democratically unaccountable actors to 
make policy would thus finally be subject to judicial review.  
2. Transparency  
Accounting for private sector influence in judicial review of agency 
policymaking would also enhance public transparency. To be sure, 
agencies can engage in ex parte discussions when they make policy under 
the APA.
372
 The President can also select or reject his advisors without 
external oversight.
373
 Inherent in his constitutional role is an “executive 
privilege” to keep certain information secret “among governmental 
employees.”374 But there is a difference between “closely-held executive 
deliberations” and “public dialogue” about policies affecting the populace 
at large.
375
 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, the Court 
acknowledged the constitutional importance of transparent government, 
explaining that “transparency enables the electorate to make informed 
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”376 
For Congress’s part, the FACA recognizes the importance of imposing 
transparency requirements on certain policy forums within the executive 
branch.
377
 In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court explained 
that “the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, 
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proposed rule is published in the Federal Register. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 362–63. 
 373. See Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 242 (2008) 
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 374. See Dannenmaier, supra note 155, at 334, 344 (citing McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 
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 376. 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). 
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particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more 
specifically to the topic at hand.”378 An approach to Chevron step zero that 
embraces judicial review of the process by which agencies draft policy for 
consistency with congressional prerogatives to delegate to executive 
branch agencies is consistent with the legislative objectives underlying the 
FACA, which the Court has described as “opening many advisory 
relationships to public scrutiny except in certain narrowly defined 
situations.”379 Under current statutory and constitutional doctrine, private 
sector influence over the rulemaking process occurs largely in the 
shadows. Judicial application of Chevron step zero to effectively require 
agencies to make public the extent to which they have allowed private 
parties to exercise congressionally-delegated policymaking functions 
would further the FACA’s legislative objective, which mirrors the 
Constitution’s implicit valuing of open government.  
3. Legitimacy  
Additionally, the development of a subdelegation doctrine and a 
reading of Chevron step zero as enabling judicial scrutiny of private sector 
influence in the rulemaking process would enhance government legitimacy 
in at least three ways: by making rulemaking more inclusive, by lessening 
bias in the regulatory process, and by tethering agency lawmaking to 
constitutional structures. 
First, judicial review of private sector influence on rulemaking would 
render final rules more democratically inclusive. Legitimacy in agency 
rulemaking derives from the authorizing statute and the process for 
developing rules, including public participation. Public participation 
functions as “a substitute for the electoral process that bestows 
constitutional legitimacy on legislation.”380 It also informs lawmakers 
about what policy outcome is in the public interest. For these reasons, 
policymaking is democratically legitimate only if it is inclusive; otherwise, 
there is no reason to prefer agency decisionmaking to that of federal 
judges who, despite having “no constituency” and functioning outside 
“either political branch of the government,”381 operate with political 
independence by virtue of their life tenure and salary protections.
382
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Inclusiveness is also embedded in the legislative objectives of the APA 
itself. The statute’s legislative history indicates that “[i]n the ‘rule making’ 
(that is, ‘legislative’) function[,] with certain exceptions, agencies must 
publish notice and at least permit interested parties to submit their views in 
writing for agency consideration before the issuance of general 
regulations.”383 Indeed, a contemporary scholar remarked eight years after 
the APA’s passage that the law “was the culmination of a generation of 
effort on the part of students of American administrative law who felt that 
administrative power was . . . not sufficiently safeguarded and sometimes 
put to arbitrary and biased use.”384  
Second, judicial construction of interstitial gaps in legislation is more 
legitimate than private sector policymaking because private parties are 
beholden to their own stakeholders’ interests. Legitimacy “relies on the 
notion that value judgments are made by [government] policy makers, and 
that managers and street-level workers are only implementing the 
policy.”385 With outsourcing, “the government is not only purchasing 
services but also ‘purchasing’ private sector logic and ethos in service 
delivery” (i.e., “market culture and values”).386 Sometimes private 
interests converge with those of the public, but sometimes they do not. To 
the extent that private parties operate out of self-interest, rulemakings that 
are heavily influenced by factions of the private sector lack the legitimacy 
of exclusively governmental lawmaking.
387
 By applying principled canons 
and rule of law values to private lawmaking, courts can impose the 
“distributional goals”388 that APA rulemaking is designed to serve.  
Third, unlike private parties, federal judges derive legitimacy from the 
formal constitutional structures that establish the federal courts within the 
separation of powers.
389
 Legitimacy assumes that those exercising public 
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power have “the right . . . to make binding rules.”390 When the executive 
branch departs from the Constitution’s structure by outsourcing 
constitutionally derived functions, the government’s overall legitimacy is 
reduced.
391
 The private sector has no independent source of power to 
affect the general population. By confining the exercise of the people’s 
power to constitutionally vested branches of government, a private 
subdelegation doctrine and invigoration of Chevron step zero to account 
for private sector lawmaking would greatly enhance legitimacy. 
4. Rational Decisionmaking  
Finally, by counteracting the incentives of private industry to formulate 
policy that is self-serving and suboptimal for the public as a whole, 
enhanced judicial review of private influence on rulemakings would foster 
rational decisionmaking in government.  
A common thread in public choice theory is an assumption that “[t]he 
individual will order his behavior so as to maximize the likelihood of 
achieving his individually defined goals.”392 Private interest groups or 
lobbyists will accordingly push for regulatory policies that advance the 
financial interests of their constituents, with insufficient regard for the 
welfare of the public at large.
393
 Unlike Congress as a whole, individual 
bureaucrats are not constitutionally bound to publicly reach a measure of 
consensus. They are more vulnerable to influence by private interests than 
a collective Congress. When a private party is tasked with giving content 
to a rule, therefore, public power is subverted in furtherance of “private 
gain with a net loss in aggregate welfare and/or unjustifiable wealth 
transfers between groups.”394 The result is bad government.395  
By tying private sector policymaking to statutory language that reflects 
the consensus of a bicameral legislature, a subdelegation doctrine and 
revised approach to Chevron step zero would counteract self-
interestedness, thus fostering government decisionmaking that better 
serves the broader populace.
396
 The Supreme Court has characterized 
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disinterestedness in government as having deep-seated normative 
implications. In Young v. United States,
397
 it reversed a conviction for 
criminal contempt because it was secured by private lawyers appointed by 
the court. The Court explained that a private party might prosecute a weak 
case or pass over a strong one if either course “promises financial or legal 
rewards for the private client.”398 Like federal prosecutors, agencies are 
“the representative[s] . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest [is] . . . that justice shall be done.”399 Allowing regulated entities to 
occupy a privileged position in the rulemaking process undermines this 
goal. Because “[p]ublic confidence in . . . disinterested conduct . . . is 
essential” when “expansive powers and wide-ranging discretion” are 
involved,
400
 courts should be given the doctrinal tools to address private 
sector impact on rational and disinterested policymaking. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has urged the expansion of the nondelegation and Chevron 
doctrines to account for the private end of the constitutional policymaking 
continuum it describes. To the extent that executive branch agencies either 
contractually outsource or informally insource policy decisions formulated 
by factions of the private sector, courts should review the nature and scope 
of such influence to ensure compatibility with congressional intent and to 
foster constitutional norms of good government.  
To be sure, private sector influence on agency rulemakings is so well 
entrenched in the modern federal bureaucracy that any attempt to fashion 
mechanisms for judicial review will be met with suspicious reluctance. 
The line between legitimate lobbying and constitutionally grounded 
policymaking is difficult to identify. Courts would have to develop the 
doctrine incrementally over time. Through its functionalist approach to 
delegation doctrine, the Court has long acknowledged the impracticalities 
of cabining legislative power to the precise terms of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause. Expanding existing doctrine to capture private lawmaking is of a 
piece with the pragmatic spirit of the Court’s existing separation of powers 
jurisprudence. Private lawmaking, in short, has inescapable constitutional 
implications that currently evade democratic and judicial scrutiny. The 
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development of a private subdelegation doctrine and a more nuanced 
approach to Chevron step zero would begin to address this constitutional 
blind spot, thus holding out important public law values—public 
accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and rational decisionmaking—as 
more important than notions of agency prerogative. 
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